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Executive Summary 
Introduction to the Conflict Research 
Programme 
 
The overall goal of the Conflict Research 
Programme (CRP) is to provide an 
evidence-based strategic re-orientation of 
international engagement in places 
apparently afflicted by the world’s most 
intractable violent conflicts. Its premise is 
that in these places, the ability of public 
authorities to provide even the most basic 
level of governance is subject to the 
functioning of the ‘real politics’ of gaining, 
managing and holding power, which we 
argue functions as a ‘political marketplace’. 
This approach helps explain the 
frustrations of state-building and 
institutionally-focused engagement; it can 
also inform the design of improved 
interventions, which reduce the risk and 
impact of conflict and violence in 
developing countries, alleviating poverty 
and insecurity. A key objective of our 
research, and a key contribution to the 
‘Better Delivery’ agenda within DFID, is to 
make policies better targeted, more 
nuanced and rooted in a clear 
understanding of the social condition that 
undergirds persistent contemporary 
conflict.  
The locations for research are Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Iraq, Somalia, South 
Sudan and Syria. Our central hypothesis is 
that governance in these difficult places is 
dominated by the logic of a political 
marketplace. These political markets are 
turbulent, violent and integrated into 
regional and global networks of power and 
money. We also hypothesise that moral 
populism (most visible in identity politics, 
persecuting ideologies and violent 
extremism) is a counterpart to the 
marketisation of politics, and that the two 
flourish in conditions of persistent 
uncertainty, conflict and trauma. Current 
policy frameworks and tools can neither 
capture the everyday realities of politics 
and governance in these difficult places, 
nor adjust to the dynamics of contested 
power relations. External interventions risk 
being enmeshed in logics of power and 
may end up inadvertently supporting 
violence and authoritarianism. At the same 
time, in all war-torn spaces, there are 
relatively peaceful zones: what we term 
‘pockets of civicness’. These might be 
territorial (local ceasefires, or inclusive 
local authorities), social (civil society 
groups helping the vulnerable or countering 
sectarian narratives, or customary courts 
solving disputes fairly) or external 
(interventions that regulate flows of 
political finance). 
The CRP will generate evidence-based, 
operationally relevant research that can 
enable real-time analysis of the dynamics 
of conflict, contestation, ‘civicness’ and 
public authority, enabling better 
interventions to manage and resolve 
armed conflict, reduce violence, and create 
conditions for more accountable and 
transparent governance. A core 
component of the CRP is to contribute to a 
better understanding of “what works” in 
addressing violent conflict across our 
research sites. We will develop 
comparative understanding of how 
different interventions affect violent 
conflict and the risk of renewed violent 
conflict across our research sites. We will 
also examine the contextual factors that 
affect the effectiveness of these 
interventions. Intervention areas selected 
for comparative research are security 
interventions; civil society and community 
mediation interventions; resource 
interventions; and interventions designed to 
strengthen authority and legitimacy, 
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including at the sub-national level. We 
envisage emerging findings from our 
political economy analysis of conflict 
drivers to shape our comparative analysis 
of specific interventions.  
Our research methods include (a) 
comparative political ethnography (b) 
refined datasets (c) models of violence and 
political business (d) socio-political 
mapping of the structural drivers of conflict 
and the groups involved in political 
mobilisation and coercion and (e) action 
research exploring agents of change. We 
have a unique and robust infrastructure of 
local researchers and civil society 
networks across all our sites that will 
facilitate both fieldwork research and 
remote research. The CRP team is already 
closely engaged with key political 
processes – and regional actors - in the 
countries concerned, designed to promote 
peace, humanitarian action, human rights 
and democracy. This engagement is a key 
part of our method and will ensure that 
evidence-based research is effectively 
communicated to institutions engaged in 
trying to reduce the risk and impact of 
violent conflict in our research sites. Our 
emphasis is upon a mix of research 
methods and mechanisms for engaging in 
policy and practice. In line with this flexible 
approach, we will hold an annual in-country 
workshop with each DfID country office, 
and key stakeholders, to work through the 
implications of our research for them in a 
practical, flexible and responsive way. This 
will be supplemented by regular written 
and face-to-face/virtual communication 
with country staff.  
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CRP Research in South Sudan 
 
South Sudan is an exemplar of a violent, 
fragmented, kleptocratic political 
marketplace. Its nascent state-level 
institutions are subsidiary to the 
transactional politics pursued by a narrow 
group of elites. This political system is 
historically rooted and regionalised, shaped 
by the legacy of decades of war such that 
stability has only ever been a temporary 
achievement.  The eruption of conflict in 
December 2013 brings the salience of 
political marketplace analysis into sharp 
focus. Political economy analysis alone, 
however, is not enough. We also require a 
much better understanding of the powerful 
ideologies that mobilise violence, as well 
as the counter-logics that 
encourage peaceful relations and freedom 
to push for positive social change.  
The CRP will undertake operationally 
relevant research in South Sudan to 
explore the political economy drivers of 
conflict, as well as the ideologies and 
conditions that encourage popular 
violence, and those that encourage peace 
and accountability. This will inform those in 
Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) who 
engage directly with South Sudanese 
officials, such as during peace 
negotiations. It will also be crucial for wider 
analysis of HMG’s broader interventions in 
South Sudan. 
Research will be undertaken using a 
comparative, multi-methods case study 
approach, analysing the drivers of conflict 
and violence. Research will be informed by 
a series of workshops that develop the 
metrics and measurements for political 
markets, including tools to measure 
economic power and its interaction with 
political power. It will also be informed by 
broader theoretical development of how 
and why persecuting ideologies emerge 
and flourish, and how and where this can 
be countered through alternative, peaceful 
logics of governance. Our comparative 
political marketplace case studies will 
highlight a range of possible solutions to 
problems that have beleaguered 
international interventions, helping donors 
to understand where something has or has 
not worked and why.  Here we will give 
particular focus to the CRP’s four 
intervention areas: building state capacity 
and legitimacy, including at subnational 
levels; security arena reform; resource 
management and community mediation 
and dialogue for peacebuilding. CRP will 
work alongside implementing 
organisations including Girls’ Education 
South Sudan and churches involved in 
community mediation at a local and 
national level. All policy recommendations 
will be developed in consultation with a 
South Sudan Research Panel that will 
consist of a small group of representative 
and prominent South Sudanese academics 
and public intellectuals.  We will also work 
closely with the UK funded Conflict 
Sensitivity Research Facility in South 
Sudan to ensure that research findings are 
communicated and influence HMG, other 
donors and their partners who work in 
South Sudan.  Our operationally relevant 
research will be published in the form of 
policy briefs, memos and peer-reviewed 
journal articles. 
 
  
6          South Sudan Synthesis Paper       October 2017  
Introduction 
 
The first part of this paper combines a 
summary and review of literature on the 
evolution of complex and persistent violent 
conflicts in South Sudan.  This review is 
structured around the analytical framework 
used by the CRP to examine the drivers of 
conflict and the prospects for peace, 
namely public authority and the logics of 
the political marketplace, moral populism, 
and ‘civicness’. The review also explores 
the gender dynamics of conflict and 
violence. The regional dynamics that 
intersect with the trajectory of South 
Sudan’s conflict are touched on in passing 
and examined in greater detail in the 
synthesis paper on the Horn of Africa.   
The latter half of the paper then uses 
existing studies to provide an analysis of 
the impacts of international interventions 
in South Sudan and to identify priorities for 
future research into ‘what works’. It 
focuses on interventions aimed at 
strengthening authority and legitimacy 
(including at sub-national levels), resource 
interventions and the management of land 
and boundaries, the ‘security arena’, and 
civil society and community mediation 
interventions.  
The outbreak of civil war in December 2013 
prompted a proliferation of policy papers 
and literature aimed at explaining the 
origins and trajectory of the crisis. 
Literature has documented the horror of 
the armed violence (Commission for 
Human Rights 2017; United Nations 2014).  
Explanations included divisions in the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), 
international state-building failures, 
resource competition and elite greed 
(Enough 2016; Small Arms Survey 2016).  
Recent reports also shed light on the socio-
cultural, economic and other structural 
factors that legitimise conflict-related 
human rights abuses including against 
women and girls, and in particular the 
treatment of females as “property” on the 
battlefield (see Amnesty International 
2017; Justice Africa, CEPO and SSWLA 
2016).   However, to gain deeper insights 
into the roots of the crisis we need to 
situate it in the longer history of 
governance in the region and not limit our 
focus to the actions of military and political 
elites. By drawing upon historical and 
ethnographic research on South Sudan, we 
can trace the political evolution of various 
authorities and of the conflict itself (de 
Waal 2016).    
Alex de Waal (2011, 2014) has argued that 
the conflict is rooted in the turbulent 
politics of a system of violent transactional 
politics, a political marketplace, in which 
loyalties are bought and sold.  After the 
events of December 2013, de Waal’s 
argument quickly gained popular traction in 
policy debates and scholarship. Based on 
long-term observations of South Sudan’s 
elite politics, de Waal’s argument built on 
recognition that the SPLA developed a rent-
seeking approach to aid from its early 
years in the 1980s and then funded its 
political market through oil revenues after 
the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA).   
At the same time, the review of literature in 
this paper highlights that this ‘political 
marketplace’ explanation for conflict needs 
to be tested and developed.  How has the 
political marketplace changed when oil 
prices, aid, and other fundamentals of the 
economy in South Sudan have fluctuated?  
How does it operate at, and connect to, the 
sub-national level and local governance?  
How does the national political 
marketplace interact with the regional 
political economy?  How does this logic of 
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the political marketplace interact with other 
logics of authority?  Previous literature 
from the post CPA era helps us to explore 
these questions and to identify gaps in our 
understanding of public authority in South 
Sudan that require further research.  
In relation to interventions that work, it is 
now well understood that international 
interventions need to be developed from a 
confident and realistic understanding of 
the political economy of conflict.  There is 
also an emerging appetite to understand 
how international interventions interact 
with the political market.  Previous 
literature has shown how humanitarian aid 
can shape political legitimacy (Karim et al. 
1996; Moro et al. 2017).  In relation to 
resource interventions, literature highlights 
the shifting value of land (Leonardi and 
Santchi 2016) and growing number of 
conflicts over land.  In relation to 
interventions in the security arena, 
literature has failed to consider the impact 
of neighbouring states and has often 
limited analysis to the formal security 
sector.  Literature on mediations has often 
looked at either the local or international, 
and failed to see the relationships between 
these different levels. We suggest that 
there is much to be learnt to help fill these 
gaps in analysis by considering how these 
interventions interact with the 
contemporary logics of the political 
marketplace and the intentions of political 
entrepreneurs at the sub-national, national 
and regional levels.  
This synthesis paper ends by proposing a 
research agenda and approach that 
responds to the findings and gaps 
                                                     
1 For a working definition of grey literature, see Jessica Hagen-
Zanker and Richard Mallett, ‘How to do a rigorous, evidence 
focused literature review in international development,’ ODI 
Working Paper, September 
2013,https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/8572.pdf. 
identified in the literature review and 
analysis.  It highlights the implementing 
organisations that CRP will work alongside, 
including churches, courts and HMG-
funded programmes including Girls’ 
Education in South Sudan (GESS), the 
South Sudan Humanitarian Programme 
(HARRIS) and the Conflict Sensitivity 
Resource Facility (CSRF). 
Methodology 
 
The paper draws upon a literature search 
conducted according to the following 
method. Instead of a traditional, 
comprehensive literature review of all the 
social science literature on conflict in 
South Sudan, this search focused on 
identifying empirically grounded social 
science literature on the drivers and effects 
of conflict in South Sudan. The search 
process itself consisted of two stages: a 
database driven search, and a ‘snowball’ 
search which augmented the database 
search and also formed the basis of our 
study of the ‘grey’ literature.1 
Initially, eight social science databases 
were searched: Taylor and Francis journals, 
JSTOR, Cambridge journals, Oxford 
journals, Hein Online, Wiley Online, SAGE 
journals, and Project MUSE. The search 
results from these databases were then 
cross-checked against the search results 
from Tufts University’s library search 
engines. One primary search string was 
used, and for each database a secondary 
search was carried out to supplement the 
results of the first search string.2  
2 The initial search string used was {“political economy” AND 
“conflict” AND “South Sudan”}. A secondary search was then 
carried out using the search terms {“conflict” AND “South 
Sudan”}.   
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The following inclusion/exclusion criteria 
were applied: 
Language: Only studies published in 
English were selected – this was 
recognised as an unavoidable limitation, 
given resource constraints, although in the 
case of South Sudan this will not affect the 
results significantly.   
Focus on empirical data: From our search 
results we only selected studies that 
contained or referenced local level 
empirical data. For instance, we excluded 
comparative studies which were not based 
on empirical data/findings generated by 
the authors.   
‘Cut-off’ points: In both searches, after a 
preliminary scan it became clear that the 
degree of relevance decreased 
substantially after the first 120 articles on 
most databases. Results after the first 120 
were not considered.  
It became clear that the systematic 
database search was missing key 
academic literature. A ‘snowball’ technique 
was therefore used to supplement the 
database search, where we (a) examined 
relevant social science literature known to 
us through our own research and expertise 
(including the books and grey literature in 
the personal collections of the lead 
researchers), (b) examined relevant 
footnotes and bibliographies of the articles 
and books that the database searches had 
yielded, and (c) drew upon the 
comprehensive bibliography of 
publications on South Sudan from 1850 to 
2000 compiled by Tvedt (2000). 
After the database and snowball searches, 
we examined the search results in greater 
detail, paying particular attention to the 
empirical data in the various articles. Some 
of the search results which initially 
appeared to be empirically grounded were, 
on closer reading, either entirely theoretical 
or conceptual in nature, or relied on 
empirical data from larger cross-country 
databases. In particular, a number of 
articles purported to ‘explain’ the actual 
empirics of the conflict, and devoted 
themselves to a description of recent 
outbreaks of violence (notably in December 
2013). These were discarded, and the 
remaining articles were read and 
annotated.  
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1. Examining the Evolution of 
Complex and Persistent Violent 
Conflicts 
 
Violent conflict has been the dominant 
mode of political contention in southern 
Sudan3 since 1955. As such, the notion of 
the state as a legitimate, stable and 
singular political authority has routinely 
been questioned in studies of the Sudans.  
However, the birth of South Sudan in 2011 
yielded hopes and agendas for change. 
These were vividly expressed by South 
Sudanese politicians in the new Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
government and influenced international 
interventions and support. Following the 
CPA in 2005 and national independence in 
2011, the government of South Sudan 
(GoSS) was the recipient of enormous 
international goodwill, finance and 
technical assistance in support of building 
the institutions of a functional state.  The 
UK, alongside others such as the USA, 
Norway and the European Union, invested 
heavily in this agenda.  The shared 
assumption was that strengthening the 
capacity and legitimacy of the institutions 
of the nascent state was essential for 
peace and development in South Sudan.  
This reflects a broader international 
investment in state-building encouraged by 
the proliferation of new states since the 
1990s, their apparent fragility and repetitive 
low performance on development 
indicators, and the more general 
assumption that good institutions and 
good governance are necessary for 
development. 
In response, much of the scholarship on 
South Sudan reflects historical legacies, 
calling attention to existing forms of 
                                                     
3 This paper uses the convention of referring to ‘southern Sudan’ 
up to independence in July 2011 and ‘South Sudan’ thereafter, 
noting that (a) the usage in quotations from other authors is not 
political authority and modes of 
governance while questioning the record of 
the SPLM.  ‘A bloodstained chronicle or a 
blank page?’ Edward Thomas (2015: 53) 
asks, placing two quotations from 
President Salva Kiir’s speeches, both made 
in July 2011, side by side: 
A happy day like this should not dwell 
on bad memories, but it is important 
to recognize that for many 
generations this land has seen untold 
suffering and death 
The Republic of South Sudan is like a 
white paper – tabula rasa!  
Thomas’ work on the ongoing war in 
Jonglei exposes persistent violence and 
deep social and economic inequalities 
within the new state. Even those convinced 
by the SPLM project identified a series of 
emerging problems. LeRiche and Arnold 
(2012) explore the history and prospects of 
South Sudan within this frame, while also 
highlighting the limitations of the CPA and 
indicating the significant loss to the SPLM 
in the death of John Garang. Additionally, 
Deng (2013) expounds on the vision of the 
late John Garang, and laments the fact that 
it was not implemented by his successors.  
In this post CPA era of state-building, 
scholarship responded to the notion of 
South Sudan as a blank slate by 
highlighting the longevity of many of the 
governance institutions in South Sudan, 
including the chiefs and the chiefs’ courts 
(Leonardi 2013).  Echoing literature on 
legal pluralism throughout Africa, research 
also highlighted that customary authorities 
were not necessarily and clearly distinct 
from government (Leonardi et al 2010).  
always consistent and (b) ‘South Sudan’ is used where both 
meanings are appropriate. 
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Frustrations with the central South 
Sudanese government encouraged 
international donors and partners to 
explore working with local and customary 
actors.  Recent research has also 
highlighted the resilience of these forms of 
public authority despite the current wars 
(Ibreck and Pendle 2016).  
The outbreak of war in 2013 shifted the 
terms of the policy and academic debate 
to focus on the causes of violence within 
South Sudan.  Since December 2013, with 
new concerns about the nature of the 
governing elites of the state, the 
international community has debated and 
often disagreed on the legitimacy of their 
own investments in state-building.  In 
analysis on the causes of conflict, the 
focus has shifted away from a failed state, 
and there has been new space for 
recognition of the centrality of patronage 
politics.  
There is rich historical material, including 
studies of the previous conflicts (1955-72 
and 1983-2005), that suggests the 
explanatory value of the CRP ‘logics of 
public authority’ approach. We examine the 
evidence in three parts to synthesise 
material that is relevant to understanding 
the logics of public authority in South 
Sudan:  
(i) We examine the nature of the 
state, South Sudan’s political 
marketplace, and its relationship 
to conflict.  
(ii) We consider studies of ethnic 
conflict that relate to the 
concept of moral populism.  
(iii) We discuss civic forms of 
authority that relate to the 
concept of civicness.   
The Analytical Framework 
To explore the evolution of complex, violent 
conflict in South Sudan, the CRP will make 
use of a set of existing theoretical and 
conceptual insights that help to explain the 
political economy of contemporary civil 
wars. These build on Kaldor’s analysis of 
‘new wars’ (2007), de Waal’s account of the 
political marketplace (2015) and the 
extensive work of previous scholars of 
Africa on the concept of public authority 
(for example Leonardi 2013; Lund 2006; 
Hoffmann and Vlassenroot 2014). 
Our starting premise is that in settings 
such as South Sudan the state in practice 
is not a tangible set of institutions that 
delivers for citizens.  In South Sudan there 
are a plurality of public authorities. At the 
same time, citizens do hope for state-like 
institutions and notions of authority.  Plus, 
we understand war not as an aberration 
but as integral to the historical mode of 
governance in the Sudans. This suggests 
that the variety of forms of public authority, 
the ways in which they generate 
compliance, and the relations between 
them must be central to the explanation 
for, and potential resolution of, conflict.  
This has yielded a conceptual framework 
for the analysis of public authority defined 
by the three logics of the ‘political 
marketplace’, ‘moral populism’ and 
‘civicness’.  These are defined and explored 
individually below. The development of the 
nascent logics is ongoing and the 
refinement of the analytical framework will 
be integral to the CRP research itself.  They 
cannot be fully explained at this point as 
the intention is for research during CRP to 
better develop and test these logics, so 
that they can be used as a framework for 
future understanding.   For example, in the 
first year we have proposed a series of 
workshops on the political marketplace, to 
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explore the theory, metrics, measurement 
and policy implications of the political 
marketplace analysis, drawing upon the 
knowledge and expertise of economists, 
experts in related thematic areas, and 
country specialists. In addition, there is 
more to be understood about vernacular 
understandings of ‘civicness’ and how 
people still have freedom to push for 
positive social change in the often 
oppressive context of South Sudan. 
1.1 The ‘political marketplace’ 
The view that South Sudan’s political crisis 
and conflict can best be understood as 
rooted in a system of violent transactional 
politics, a ‘political marketplace’, has been 
put forward by de Waal (2011, 2014).  It 
suggests that gaining and maintaining 
power is based upon a speeded up, 
dollarised mode of transactional politics, in 
which institutions are subordinate to 
bargaining for political gain.  The ‘political 
marketplace’ understanding of the crisis is 
supported by an array of historical studies 
that provide insights into the nature of the 
SPLA and violence, patronage politics, and 
the state as an inherently predatory and 
violent force. This understanding of the 
conflict has now gained much traction in 
the policy literature (The Sentry 2016). 
According to de Waal, South Sudan’s 
political marketplace reproduces the logics 
of governance familiar from the political 
history of Sudan since the 1970s (de Waal 
2015).  During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
SPLA quickly became rent seeking and the 
leadership founds ways to acquire 
finances, including through the capture of 
aid.  Then, after the 2005 CPA and the 
institution of the new SPLA-dominated 
Southern Sudanese government, funding 
of political budgets has largely depended 
on access to revenues from oil wealth. Yet 
the Kiir government has generally had a 
weak handle on the management of the 
business of politics and has been 
consistently subject to ‘rent-seeking 
rebellions’ since its establishment. Its most 
significant miscalculation was the decision 
to shut down the oil pipeline in 2012, a 
decision which helped precipitate the crisis 
(de Waal 2014).     
The historical significance of oil in the 
1983-2005 war and peace agreement have 
been widely studied (Human Rights Watch 
2003; Patey 2010; de Waal 2014). There 
has thus far been remarkably little analysis 
of the oil shutdown of 2012 and its 
implications, beyond the extreme austerity 
measures that were implemented out of 
necessity, and the fact that the security 
sector was largely exempt from budget 
cuts. There is, however, a general 
recognition that South Sudan is a rentier 
state par excellence, highly dependent on 
oil. 
Since de Waal’s 2014 article that 
summarised the political marketplace in 
South Sudan, the context has changed (de 
Waal 2014). Sources of funding for the 
political marketplace have fluctuated. Plus, 
the political marketplace appears to have 
fragmented. There are questions of 
whether public authority amongst the 
armed opposition internally also continues 
to follow this logic of the political 
marketplace.  The CRP has the advantage 
of being able to observe, over time, the 
shifting nature of the political marketplace 
in South Sudan and, from this, to observe 
patterns in the way this logic is used.  
The SPLA and violence  
The violent struggle for control of South 
Sudan’s political marketplace has largely 
been pursued by the political-military elite 
within the SPLA. Little has been written on 
the origins and early years of the SPLA, and 
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most of that has been either the memoirs 
of dissenters and critics (Akol 1995; Nyaba 
1997) or compilations of sundry 
documentary sources that shed an 
unflattering light on the movement in its 
heyday (African Rights 1997). Only with 
rose-tinted spectacles can the period 1983-
91 be described as ‘golden years of 
revolution’ (LeRiche and Arnold 2012). 
These studies, limited though they are, 
indicate that contemporary accounts that 
date the beginning of internal conflict 
within the SPLA to the split of 1991 are 
incorrect: the problems were present from 
the very foundation of the movement in 
1983. 
The composition of the SPLA after the CPA 
was shaped by the integration of multiple 
southern Sudanese militia that emerged 
during the second civil war, on the subject 
of which there has only been very limited 
academic analysis (de Waal 1994; 
Hutchinson 2001; Young 2003, 2006). The 
numerous ‘tribal’ militia emerged from a 
mix of local ethnic politics and rivalries, 
economic discontent and opportunities for 
enrichment from raiding and looting, and 
deliberate military strategy by the 
Sudanese government (in addition some 
militia within northern Sudan were 
associated with political parties with 
national political agendas.) By the end of 
the war, the largest constellation of pro-
Khartoum militia was the South Sudan 
Defence Force (SSDF). There is small but 
detailed literature on how this group was 
constituted and incorporated into the SPLA 
after the 2006 Juba Agreement (Arnold 
2007; Young 2006, 2012).  
By the end of the long north-south war, the 
SPLA had come to resemble neither a 
classic guerrilla force nor a regular army, 
but rather a militarised and kleptocratic 
version of southern Sudan’s administrative 
tribalism. Clémence Pinaud has aptly 
described this as a ‘military aristocracy’ 
and ‘military kinship inc.’ (Pinaud 2014, 
2016). The outbreak of the new civil war in 
2013 caused the expanded SPLA to crack 
apart following the lines along which it had 
been stitched together eight years earlier. 
The split was ethnic insofar as the 
command structures of the constituent 
units had themselves been constructed on 
the basis of kinship and patronage. In turn, 
the GoSS turned to its own ‘militia strategy’ 
echoing that adopted by Khartoum thirty 
years earlier. A conflict that began as a 
conflict between two readily-identifiable 
‘sides’ with political agendas, fighting for 
control of the state (Johnson 2014) rapidly 
morphed into a more complex, fragmented 
and widely-dispersed set of conflicts 
(Rolandsen et al. 2015). There is, however, 
a very substantial evidentiary gap 
concerning the dynamics whereby multiple 
local armed groups emerged: some 
incubated within the SPLA, others as 
outgrowths of the SPLA-in Opposition 
(SPLA –IO), and still others by different 
processes entirely (see below). 
Extractive and patronage politics 
A political marketplace does not function 
solely on the basis of personal corruption, 
material incentives and violence. Rather it 
is a market in which power is a commodity, 
and political projects are subject to market 
forces. Elements of this are apparent in the 
political competitions within the ruling 
party and security apparatus (Roessler 
2016) and the anticipated electoral 
competition (Brosché and Högland 2016).  
Political leaders have also remade state 
regulatory frameworks in order to extract 
resources (Twijnstra 2015; Twijnstra and 
Titeca 2016).  
A core concept in this regard is 
kleptocracy. In its commonsense meaning, 
13          South Sudan Synthesis Paper       October 2017  
‘kleptocracy’ refers to the rule of thieves 
(Enough 2017); in its sociological meaning 
it refers also to the operation of a system 
of governance in which public office is 
allocated and utilised according to the laws 
of supply and demand, typically intermixed 
with violence, rather than by administrative 
rules and procedures (de Waal 2014). 
The World Bank public expenditure reports 
for southern/South Sudan (World Bank 
2007, 2013) are astonishingly candid in 
their documentation of bureaucratic 
dysfunction, parallel decision-making and 
resource-allocation mechanisms, and the 
extent of corruption. Ferenc Markó (2016) 
details a similar parallelism at work in the 
passport office in Juba, in which a model 
system of biometric passports is 
established alongside a shadow system in 
which decisions about who gets and does 
not get a passport are made on other 
criteria entirely. Santschi’s analysis of the 
2008 census illuminates how the exercise 
in counting people—in principle the 
simplest and most objective exercise that 
a state can undertake—was profoundly 
politicised in Sudan. In particular, the SPLM 
sought to ensure that the number of 
southern Sudanese voters was sufficient 
for their representatives to maintain their 
veto-wielding bloc in the national assembly 
(Santschi 2008). 
Existing studies demonstrate the ‘Janus-
face’ of South Sudanese institutions, and 
the way in which a formal institution with 
bureaucratic procedures coexists with a 
shadow institution, run on the basis of 
patronage and power politics. Larson, Ajak 
and Pritchett (2013: 21) provide the 
following example: 
One donor official distinguished between 
the ‘Real Ministry of Finance’ and the ‘Fake 
Ministry of Finance.’ The ‘Fake Ministry’ is 
the one working with the donors and 
technical advisors on budget allocations, 
promoting the outward appearance of high 
functionality, while the ‘Real Ministry’ is 
operated through backdoor dealings 
between South Sudanese officials, 
concealed from donor view. As the donor 
official says: ‘The technical advisors help 
prepare budget allocations, but then the 
army generals wheel into the minister’s 
office, and they make the real allocations.’ 
While budget allocations are readily and 
publically available from MoFEP, the 
budget expenditures are only rarely (and 
then, only partially) shared. 
Histories of the state and conflict in the 
Sudans  
There is a rich historical and political 
science literature on the nature of the 
(united) Sudanese state. Not all of this 
work reinforces the view that the core 
problem is the transactional politics of the 
‘marketplace’. Indeed, the political 
pathologies that afflicted Sudan since 
independence in 1956 have frequently 
been ascribed to the shortcomings of the 
state inherited from the colonial era and 
the ethno-racial, economic and other 
inequalities bequeathed to it, or to the 
ineffective or counterproductive attempts 
by post-colonial rulers to transform the 
state into an Arab nationalist, socialist or 
Islamist state. 
However, alternative explanations can also 
be woven into an overarching 
understanding that institutions have been 
subsidiary to a violent politics of bargaining 
pursued by the core at the expense of the 
periphery.  De Waal (2006) provides a 
synthesis of five different approaches to 
understanding the causes of conflict in 
Sudan. These explain conflict either as a 
clash of identities and associated with the 
lack of a cohesive national identity; as a 
consequence of the inequality between 
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centre and periphery and economic 
exploitation; as a fight for survival with 
dwindling resources in the rural areas; as 
emergent from instability and intra-elite 
competition at the centre; or as a product 
of criminality, and a cycle of violence. It 
suggests that while each of these analyses 
has some traction, only an explanation that 
recognises the critical role of strategies 
adopted by Sudanese government to 
manage the periphery, based on political 
bargaining and sponsorship of militias, 
militarising governance, can embrace their 
various insights and explain the 
relationships between them.  
These frameworks for understanding 
Sudan are relevant insofar as the post CPA 
and post-independence South Sudanese 
state in Juba is related to its immediate 
Sudanese predecessor in Khartoum. Much 
less has been written on the South 
Sudanese state and its predecessors, 
namely the regional governments of 
southern Sudan (1972-82 and 2005-11), or 
the governance functions of the rebel 
movements (Anyanya 1963-72 and SPLM 
1983-2005). Among these are: Shepherd 
(1966); El Obeid (1980); Beshir (1984); Alier 
(1990); Tvedt (1994); Akol (2007) and 
Abusharaf (2013). Regrettably few have 
been written by southern Sudanese. There 
is, by contrast, a relatively rich seam of 
southern Sudanese writing on the political 
challenges of southern Sudan (Oduhu and 
Deng 1963; Joseph Garang 2010; John 
Garang 1987, 1992; Malwal 2015) and on 
the experience of the liberation movement 
(Akol 1995; Nyaba 1997; Madut-Arop 
2006). Each of these historical pieces 
provide insights relevant to understanding 
the SPLM, even if they do not seek to 
produce a comprehensive account of the 
political economy of conflict.  
The historical and anthropological 
literature on South Sudan does, however, 
contain rich material on local perceptions 
and experiences of government. This 
reveals the manifestations of public 
authority (without using the label) and 
vernacular concepts of the state. The 
striking absence of the state in many 
places and during many eras, or its peculiar 
if intermittent manifestations as an alien, 
brutal or kleptocratic force, means that 
South Sudanese people have become 
attuned to certain characteristics of 
government. Hutchinson (1996, 1998) and 
Leonardi (2007, 2015) have authored the 
leading publications in this area. An 
important finding of this research is that 
the state is seen as an alien Leviathan, 
defined by its capacity to kill and rob with 
impunity, outside the moral-social realm, 
and thus an entity to be feared. Insofar as 
state-building and creating citizenship 
involves establishing this kind of governing 
entity, it is a deeply troubling exercise.  
The governance of the SPLM during the 
long war (1983-2005) is discussed in the 
memoirs of former SPLM leaders (Akol 
1995; Nyaba 1997), in reports of 
humanitarian agencies (for a synthesised 
compilation see African Rights 1997) and 
in a few studies such as Øystein 
Rolandsen’s account of the first SPLM 
convention of 1994 and the associated 
politics (Rolandsen 2005). These studies, 
along with those cited in the previous 
paragraph, show that the SPLM/SPLA was 
seen as a manifestation of government, 
differing from the government in Khartoum 
insofar as it was ‘our’ government. It was 
not seen as a revolutionary liberation 
movement in the sense of representing a 
democratic transformation of local public 
authority. Indeed, as John Young observed 
during the wars of the 1990s ‘failures of 
SPLM/A governance are a significant 
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factor in both the generation of… conflicts 
and their resolution.’ (2003: 425). 
Another important theme is that South 
Sudan and the region has long been 
integrated into a violent capitalist global 
order (Collins 1971; Thomas 2015). What 
may have appeared in the late colonial era 
to be an ethnographic museum of peoples, 
untouched by modernity with their social 
structures frozen in time, was in fact the 
product of a sustained and extraordinarily 
violent encounter with external forces of 
violent predation and control. 
1.2 Ethnic conflict as ‘moral populism’  
 
The logic of moral populism refers to the 
instrumentalisation of social identities and 
moral norms in political bargaining.  In the 
case of South Sudan, for example, 
politicians have often used ethnic identities 
to mobilise support and forge 
relationships.  These identities are often 
exclusionary.    
Existing literature on ethnicity and ethnic 
conflict in South Sudan is extraordinarily 
rich as over a hundred years of seminal, 
anthropological scholarship has asked 
questions about inter-ethnic fighting 
between the peoples of South Sudan. Even 
a cursory review is beyond the remit of this 
paper. The wealth of ethnographic and 
historical evidence and analysis 
concerning ethnicity, including identity 
change and the nature of ethnic 
boundaries, does not support an 
explanation of ethnic differences as the 
roots of conflict and instead reveals the 
complexities of identity politics within 
South Sudan and between South Sudanese 
groups and its neighbours. The popular 
idiom of ethnicity in South Sudan could be 
called ‘everyday primordialism’ (Fearon and 
Laitin 2000) – the widely-held belief that 
ethnic identity is in the blood and non-
negotiable, and that different ethnicities 
have different intrinsic characteristics. 
Historical and ethnographic research 
shows this to be fallacious and the 
processes of constructing and maintaining 
identity to be far more complex, and 
politically and socially-determined (Jok and 
Hutchinson 1999; Hutchinson 2001; 
Laudati 2011; Hutchinson and Pendle 
2015; Pendle 2014).  
A common thread across the history of 
South Sudan is that conflict and fear of 
conflict play important roles in making 
certain kinds of ethnic identity and identity 
boundaries salient. The role of the diaspora 
and inter-ethnic relations among exiled 
communities are also significant (Moro 
2004). Historians have also shown that 
since colonial days and the system of 
‘native administration’, the ‘tribe’ has been 
a unit of administration. Indeed, ‘tribe’ and 
tribal authorities were an intermediary in 
colonial conquest and pacification, local 
government on the cheap, and post-
colonial counter-insurgency (Johnson 
2012; Thomas 2015; Leonardi 2015). ‘Tribe’ 
may also be associated with the status of 
chiefs, who have emerged as an important 
social category in modern South Sudan 
(Ahmed 2002).  
Yet the concept of ethnic difference as the 
primary social cleavage is itself a tenuous 
one, given the plurality and contestation 
associated with sub-ethnic identities. For 
instance, as Beswick finds, there are 26 
major groupings and four dialects among 
the Dinka alone. For Beswick, the theme of 
ethnic conflict remains key to the history of 
the region but emerges as a ‘factor of 
economics’ and of ‘totemic closeness to 
one’s neighbours’ (2004: 2). She shows 
that the constitution of identity in this 
region is bound up with violence, famine, 
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migration, and ‘blood memories’ extending 
into the precolonial era: ‘fierce wars, ethnic 
struggles and expansion and external slave 
raids shaped the sociopolitical and 
religious culture of the region’ (2004: 1).  
Notably, during previous civil wars debates 
about the politics of identity concentrated 
less on the clashes between and within 
ethnic groups in the South, and more on 
the invocation of a difference between 
northern and southern Sudanese identity. 
The concept of a South Sudanese nation 
was shaped by opposition to the north and 
the legacies of race and enslavement 
(Deng 1995, 2005; Beswick 2004; Jok 
2007; Leonardi 2011). This oppositional 
identity is more complex than south-north 
or African-Arab, given the Egyptian role in 
colonizing Sudan and the intermediate and 
ambiguous role of the northern Sudanese 
in that form of rule (Troutt-Powell 2003) 
and the ‘African’ nature of key elements of 
identity in northern Sudan, including the 
strong West African influence on 
nineteenth century Mahdism and twentieth 
century Islamism (Hasan 1985; El-Affendi 
1990). 
Ironically, the term ‘Sudani’ emerged during 
the colonial era primarily with reference to 
‘black’ Sudanese, from southern Sudan and 
the Nuba Mountains, and especially to the 
‘detribalised’ sons of former slaves. A 
prominent Sudani (in this sense) was Ali 
Abdel Latif, the leader of the 1924 White 
Flag nationalist movement (Vezzadini 
2015). Some ambiguities of South 
Sudanese identity are manifest in the very 
name of the country and the decision that 
Arabic, the lingua franca across much of 
South Sudan, is expressly excluded as a 
national language. The fundamentally 
political process of constituting South 
Sudanese identity has been examined by a 
number of authors including Frahm (2012) 
and Kindersley (2015). 
Additionally, the religious element of South 
Sudanese identity is the topic of much 
attention by advocates and church people. 
Among the scholars, we can single out 
those have written on churches (Falge 
2013) and traditional religions (Hutchinson 
2001), those have focused on the Islamist 
perspective (El-Affendi 1990), and those 
who those who have explored what 
‘secularism’ means in South Sudan 
(Saloman 2014). Gender is a theme 
throughout all of these studies. 
This review suggests that while the politics 
of identity has consistently been significant 
in historical conflicts in South Sudan, the 
concept of ethnic conflict has little 
analytical purchase. Identity in South 
Sudan is plural, complex and politicised.  
Therefore, the lens of ‘moral populism’ will 
help us in exploring its significance in the 
political economy of conflict.  This reminds 
us that political bargaining is also 
constrained and influenced by pre-existing 
ideas and relations from below; individuals 
and groups that feel excluded might also 
employ the bonds of kinship to exert 
leverage on political leaders. Whenever a 
leader makes an appeal to ‘the people’ or 
some segment thereof, he (less often, she) 
is making a bargain, and although the 
intent may be to manipulate, the other 
party to the bargain might also gain 
leverage. A series of recent studies of 
militias and ‘community defence groups’ 
provide insights suggesting the salience of 
identity and the potential for further 
investigation of the ways that moral 
populist logics are fuelling the current war 
(see below).  
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Militarised ‘community protection’  
A stark illustration of the ways in which 
political elites have harnessed 
relationships to their home communities to 
strengthen their positions at the national 
level is apparent from Naomi Pendle’s 
(2015) study of the changing political 
significance of the titweng, cattle guards of 
the western Dinka. SPLA commanders 
employed them to strengthen their 
authority at the local level, armed them and 
later employed their members as a ‘reserve 
army’. Some fought for the Mathiang 
Anyoor in Heglig in 2012, and on the side of 
the government in the current civil war; 
some formed a protection force for 
president Salva Kiir, Dut ku Beny. Both 
groups have been implicated in mass 
atrocities since 2013. Here we see the 
exploitation and militarisation of ethnic 
associations and the corruption of moral 
norms, in particular ‘the local idiom of 
cattle keeping youth’s legitimate use of 
violence to protect the home communities’ 
(Pendle 2015: 432). Luka Biong Deng Kuol 
(2017) finds that the titweng, and their 
counterparts in the gelweng (the Dinka 
cattle guards that organised further south), 
retain some ‘legitimacy and support’ at the 
community level – despite their 
responsibility for extensive violence in 
Lakes state in 2014-15 and in the 
Equatorias then and since. The processes 
of forming these groups and enlisting 
young men is highly gendered. Male youth 
are often commodified for their ability to 
“protect,” and rendered vulnerable to the 
recruitment of increasingly factious armed 
groups due, in part, to an aspiration by 
those youth and their families for a 
transition to the status of societally-
validated manhood. Similarly, Pinaud 
(2014; 2016) refers to the gendered ways 
in which the “military aristocracy” is 
maintained, through the payment of 
bridewealth as a way of precipitating 
modes of attachment and deference at 
local levels.  
Relatedly, Young’s (2016) research on the 
Nuer White Army suggests a moral 
populist pressure from below, reflected in 
the growing distance between these 
fighters and their ethnic compatriots 
among the political and military elites of 
the SPLA-IO. He supports a view that after 
December 2013, SPLA-IO leader Riek 
Machar did not directly mobilise these 
forces but instead capitalised on local 
grievances and rebellion. Although the 
White Army had origins in Riek Machar’s 
attack on Bor in 1991, both then and since 
its role in violence has roots in local 
grievances. The White Army, Young 
suggests, pursued a ‘popular war that had 
the almost complete support of the 
communities from which the fighters came 
and involved very little outside support’ 
(2016: 15). Their motives, he suggests, 
need to be understood in the context of the 
December 2013 killings of Nuer in Juba 
and were motivated by ‘deep-seated hatred 
of the Dinka and a desire for revenge’ 
(2016: 15). Justice Africa similarly found 
that in Akobo gender and violence against 
women featured as part of the revenge 
narrative for the White Army and other 
youth in the area with sexual violence being 
cited as a main driver of revenge attacks at 
both the local and the national level 
(Justice Africa 2016). Breidlid and Arenson 
further enrich our understanding of this 
group with evidence that some of its 
leaders also have roles in peacemaking 
and conflict resolution, and that their turn 
to violence is partly explicable in the 
context of a ‘government security vacuum’ 
(2017: 39).  This highlights that 
interventions that focus on the security 
sector in South Sudan need to understand 
that many South Sudanese primarily rely 
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on community-based security providers.  
The security arena in South Sudan is not 
limited to the formal security sector of 
government or the warring parties, but 
includes a fluid plurality of actors who have 
various and shifting relations with 
government.  
Amid deep violence and protracted 
uncertainty, militias or community 
protection forces have emerged, evolved 
and either been captured by the political 
marketplace or presented external 
challenges to it. As Jok points out, there is 
a degree of ambivalence towards such 
groups within government, since on the 
one hand ‘national leaders might see the 
dangers of parallel defence mechanisms’ 
while on the other ‘politicians look to 
informal forces as personal armies.’ (2017: 
41). Various studies reveal the diversity 
and fluctuations in the fortunes and 
relations of these armed groups and their 
changing relations to political 
entrepreneurs at the centre, or 
communities at the periphery. These 
include important studies on the Arrow 
Boys that establish their close ties to the 
community and concern for the ‘public 
benefit’ (Koos 2014), but also changes in 
their organisation and aims over time 
(Schomerus and Taban 2017).   
Observing the waxing and waning of 
relations between ‘community defence 
groups’, the government and the 
community points to opportunities for 
interventions. The authority of elders, 
chiefs and customary authorities over 
these defence groups also appears to wax 
and wane over time.  As Biong Deng Kuol 
has argued, we need to address gaps in 
knowledge about their motives and 
relations to local public authority including:  
‘for example, evidence of resistance 
among the titweng/gelweng to elite or 
military pressure to fight, sources of 
authority or legitimacy that might regulate 
their behaviour and conduct in violence, 
and signs of more productive, peaceful 
relationships that exist locally – among 
Dinka youth or between Dinka youths and 
Nuer community forces – all of which 
could provide constructive entry points for 
peace measures.’ (2017: 26) 
1.3 Civic Authority and ‘civicness’ 
 
We recognise that in all war-torn places, 
there are relatively peaceful spaces or 
zones: what we term ‘pockets of civicness’. 
These might be territorial (for example 
local ceasefires, or inclusive local 
authorities); social (such as civil society 
groups helping the vulnerable or 
customary courts solving disputes fairly), 
or external (such as interventions that 
regulate the flows of political finance). In 
spaces of ‘civicness’ ordinary people are 
likely to have greater freedom and be able 
to push for positive social change and 
accountability.  The concept will be used to 
explore various ways in which people 
challenge or refuse to conform to the 
logics of the political marketplace and 
moral populism, and express 
commitments to the public good.  
‘Civicness’ is still a nascent concept that 
will be refined during the CRP, with 
attention paid to vernacular definitions as 
articulated by South Sudanese people.  By 
exploring this notion of ‘civicness’, the CRP 
will assist in developing interventions that 
recognise and respond to the ways 
ordinary people resist predatory and violent 
politics, garner greater freedom of choice, 
and push for change and accountability.  It 
will also provide insight into the conditions 
under which international assistance 
(including humanitarian aid) might either 
exacerbate the violence associated with 
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the political marketplace, or facilitate the 
space needed to develop forms of 
‘civicness’.  
The review finds that there are some useful 
historical and more recent studies of 
institutions, processes and norms 
concerned with the promotion of peace 
and social order that might counteract the 
dominant logics of the political 
marketplace and moral populism. These 
studies demonstrate the potential to 
uncover civic, deliberative actions in 
pursuit of the public good in South Sudan, 
even if these are marginalised or deeply 
connected to ideas about community, 
‘home’ and custom that are sometimes 
invoked in exclusionary and violent politics 
(see above). While recognising the current 
social crisis, and the damage wrought by 
repeated cycles of violence, it is still 
possible to discern an enduring logic of 
civic duty and ‘civicness’ in South Sudan.  
Yet, these displays of ‘civicness’ are often 
relatively invisible and need intricate 
research to understand them.   
The most relevant studies in the literature 
are those concerned with customary 
authority and law.  Chiefs have often been 
seen as the principle example in South 
Sudan of the logic of authority that could 
be described as ‘civicness’.  It is clear that, 
in South Sudan, chiefs represent an 
extraordinarily resilient institution of local 
governance that has survived, and even 
been strengthened, during times of war 
(Leonardi 2013).  Chiefs also have the 
potential to draw on rich cultures and 
practices of reconciliation, and to voice 
grassroots concerns, grievances and 
interests.  However, unlike other customary 
and spiritual authorities such as the Nuer 
prophets, South Sudanese understand 
chiefs as inherently linked to government 
with a role of interlocutor between the 
home communities and governments 
(including armed opposition groups).  
Many chiefs in South Sudan have built their 
legitimacy amongst their home 
communities by being protectors against 
the alien force of the governments that 
they achieve through relationship with 
governments (Leonardi 2013).  Therefore, 
chiefs can appear to operate under a logic 
of ‘civicness’ as they can provide a 
peaceful way to push against government 
and push for accountability. 
However, certainly there are limitations to 
the notion that the chieftancy is 
consistently an example of ‘civicness’ and 
always in tension with the politics of violent 
kleptocracy and ethnic exclusion. A key 
problem has been the ways in which chiefs’ 
courts reproduce and enforce gender 
inequalities and tolerate or even licence 
violence against women. Several studies 
foreground abuses of women (Mennan 
2008; 2010; Ibreck, Logan and Pendle 
2017), although they observe that women 
use the chief’s courts and that they serve 
crucial roles in ‘negotiating’ settlements 
within communities. Additionally, while 
chiefly office has survived and adapted 
during protracted wars, at times it has 
become militarised (Jok and Hutchinson 
1999; Thomas 2015). It has also been 
exploited by military actors – the SPLM/A 
sought to harness local customs and 
moral practices in its struggle again the 
government of Sudan (see, Leonardi 2007). 
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that 
chiefs have sought to distinguish 
themselves from military authority and to 
promote civil methods of dispute 
resolution.  
The power of chiefs in South Sudan has 
varied over time. Their role in customary 
courts, established since the 1930s, is 
central to their authority (Leonardi 2013), 
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but in some areas and periods they have 
also had important roles in the control of 
land (Hirblinger 2015). Chiefs have 
occupied a complicated and ambiguous 
position in the socio-political order.  
Exposed to the brutalities of external 
domination and pillage for many decades, 
South Sudanese society developed 
mechanisms for obscuring and dispersing 
the sources of indigenous authority. The 
individuals nominated as chiefs were not 
necessarily the most senior members of 
powerful lineages, nor were they the 
possessors of spiritual authority. Rather, 
they were brokers between people and the 
alien authority of the state (Leonardi 2007, 
2015). Customary law itself is the product 
of contestation (Leonardi et al. 2011) and 
has evolved in response to diverse 
influences over time, including political and 
social pressures and practical needs to 
maintain order and ‘prevent disputes from 
escalating into armed conflicts between 
different families, clans and communities’ 
(Santschi 2014: 49).  
Chiefs have contributed to limiting military 
authority and in conflict-resolution during 
past and present conflicts. They have 
sought to promote judicial redress as an 
alternative to the pursuit of revenge; and 
they have also taken lead roles in peace 
and reconciliation initiatives, with notable 
success in Wunlit in 1999.  Their attempts 
to uphold law and order and have come 
under pressure (Small Arms Survey 2014: 
4) and made them a target. They have also 
evolved in contexts of displacement, such 
as chiefs’ courts in the protection of 
civilians sites in UN camps (Ibreck and 
Pendle 2016).  
Beyond customary authority, there are, as 
Eddie Thomas and Natalia Chan (2017) 
argue, other ‘positive spaces where civic 
values still have relevance’, including the 
churches – indeed church leaders have 
historically taken the lead in peacemaking 
– while many teachers and scholars have 
also sought to maintain ‘inclusive civic 
spaces.’ There is an urgent need for further 
exploration of such spaces and the roles of 
actors such as teachers, prophets and 
lawyers (with the notable exceptions of 
Massoud 2013; Hutchinson and Pendle 
2015). The academic literature is sparse on 
how teachers, religious groups, prophets 
and other forms of customary authority, 
community councils, community based 
associations and NGOs work against the 
logics of the political marketplace and 
promote civic values. We need to consider 
the extent to which these commitments 
are embedded in institutions and norms or 
reliant on interpersonal networks, and 
whether they are shaping collective action. 
Additionally, there is a need for further 
studies to explore the gender dimensions 
of civicness, given a historical norm 
validating violent masculinity and 
participation in armed groups, and the 
possibility that the participation of women 
in these mechanisms and initiatives may 
influence civicness. 
1.4 Regional Conflict Dynamics 
 
There is remarkably little academic writing 
on the conflicts in South Sudan in their 
regional context.  This is despite there 
being deep rooted, historic, dynamic 
economic, political and security relations 
between South Sudan and its neighbours, 
and despite the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) being 
entrusted as the best medium for the 
peace negotiations. The reasons for this 
lack of writing include the country-level 
focus of most scholars and policymakers, 
and the fact that the region’s diplomats 
and politicians tend not to write political 
histories or memoirs. Accounts of the 
21          South Sudan Synthesis Paper       October 2017  
foreign policies and security strategies of 
north-east African countries tend to be 
written by officials in foreign ministries or 
scholars attached to think tanks 
associated with those ministries (e.g. 
Mesfin 2012). Others are more critical but 
not necessarily more detailed (El-Affendi 
2001). Another reason for the scarcity of 
analysis is the covert nature of most of the 
cross-border security activities.  Therefore, 
much of the political and economic trans-
national activities are almost invisible.  As a 
result, important aspects of historic and 
current wars are missed.  For example, the 
leading role played by Ethiopian, Ugandan 
and Eritrean forces in military operations of 
the 1980s and 1990s is often ignored and 
publicly credited to the SPLA (some of 
which is detailed in de Waal 2004).   
This lack of regional perspective not only 
limits understanding of South Sudan’s 
wars, but also conceals the impact of 
these wars on neighbouring countries.  For 
example, little has been written about the 
economic impact (for better or worse) of 
South Sudan’s wars on neighbouring 
countries’ economies, or the political and 
economic impact of the movements of 
refugees for host countries. 
Each one of South Sudan’s international 
borders has been crossed in anger in 
recent times. The most recent was the 
South Sudanese attack into DRC in an 
attempt to capture or kill Riek Machar and 
other leaders of the SPLA-IO (Boswell 
2017). In 2015, the Ethiopian National 
Defense Force mounted a military 
operation into South Sudan in response to 
a cross-border raid in which more than a 
hundred children were abducted. Ugandan 
People’s Defence Force units have been 
deployed inside South Sudan in support of 
the GoSS since December 2013, taking an 
active part in hostilities. Although Uganda 
is broadly supportive of the GoSS, there are 
also active unresolved boundary disputes 
in which both sides deploy armed units. 
Kenya remains in occupation of the Ilemi 
Triangle and conducts military-scale 
policing operations against cattle rustlers 
in the Triangle and occasionally across the 
boundary into adjoining areas. Small 
military incursions across the border with 
Central African Republic are not 
uncommon. The border with Sudan 
remains actively contested and the 
boundary disputes remain unresolved. 
Several of South Sudan’s neighbours are 
engaged in providing covert military or 
financial support for armed groups inside 
the country. In addition, South Sudanese 
support to the SPLM-North and the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM) remains 
active, although not on the scale that 
existed in the immediate post-
independence years. The rivalry between 
Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile waters 
also has repercussions in South Sudan, 
with reports of Egypt pressing for military 
access to parts of South Sudan adjoining 
Ethiopia. 
This kind of information tends to be 
presented as stand-alone reports on a 
case-by-case basis. The patterns of 
involvement, the rationales for it, and what 
it tells us about intra-regional politics, are 
less subject to analysis. The general 
pattern over the last six years appears to 
be one in which, during 2011-12, the GoSS 
used its relatively plentiful financial 
resources and armaments to engage in a 
conflict of mutual destabilisation with 
Sudan, while also seeking to extend its 
influence across other borders. Following 
South Sudan’s financial collapse in 2012-
13, the direction of engagement and 
destabilisation has reversed, with the 
neighbours now playing the roles of 
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purchasers in South Sudan’s domestic 
political marketplace. However, in contrast 
to other countries subject to regional 
interference in this manner, it is remarkable 
how modest those external engagements 
have been. It would be relatively 
straightforward for neighbouring countries 
to sponsor and arm significant rebel forces 
in South Sudan, but at the time of writing, 
this is not happening. 
CRP will seek to better understand the 
impact of regional political, economic and 
security dynamics on the evolution of 
violent conflict in South Sudan.  We will 
produce specific research outputs that will 
consider the economic and political ties, 
and the political marketplace in relation to 
the region.  This will intentionally include 
consideration of the impact economic 
interests have on countries’ participation in 
the peace process, and the subsequent 
implications for the authority of IGAD in 
these negotiations. 
1.5 Gender inequalities and violence 
 
War in South Sudan has shaped ‘social 
existence,’ and the constitution of gender 
relations (see, Lubkemann 2010, 13). It has 
also contributed to ‘everyday’ structural 
violence (Luedke and Logan 2017). Some 
of the enduring impacts of war include 
continuing high rates of child marriage, 
exceptionally high levels of maternal and 
child mortality, and very low levels of girls’ 
education. The confluence of factors that 
contribute to the extreme gender 
inequalities in South Sudan can be seen as 
manifestations of both the political 
marketplace – in which women and girls 
are largely treated as commodities – and 
moral populism, which appeals to social 
order based on gender assumptions and 
hierarchies. 
Research relating to the second civil war 
(1983-2005) highlights the gendered nature 
of the violence including rape, abduction, 
and forced marriage by SPLA combatants 
that created an ‘explosive mix of fear and 
resentment in communities that persisted 
in the post-war era’ (Pinaud 2014). Jok and 
Hutchinson describe the emergence of a 
‘hypermasculinised and militarised world 
view’ (2002: 101), which Jok argues is at 
the root of gender-based violence that has 
been persistent ever since (Jok 2006). 
Military actors sought to break down social 
norms that contradicted their imperatives, 
such as the ‘weaning taboo,’ which 
prevented sexual relations during 
breastfeeding. Men were urged to 
impregnate their wives to replenish the 
reserve of male fighters (see Jok 1999, 
Hutchinson 2000); a ‘nationalization of the 
womb’ (Jok 1999: 432). Hutchinson found 
that the customary ethical restraints 
protecting women and children from 
warfare and rape were eroded in the post-
1991 wars (Hutchinson 1996: 338).  
The SPLA also promoted some aspects of 
traditional Southern cultures and identities, 
particularly related to family, home life and 
patrilocal marriage (see Jok 1999). But in 
the context of war, patriarchal customary 
norms have constrained women’s agency 
and entrenched gender equalities (Arabi 
2011; D’Awol 2011), and made women 
vulnerable to violence (Lacey 2013). In her 
study of abductions of women in Jonglei 
state in the conflict between Lou Nuer and 
Murle communities after 2009, Lizzie 
Lacey finds that women are ‘legitimate 
spoils of war’ and argues that abductions, 
sexual slavery and sexual violence are 
directly rooted in the customary 
bridewealth system: ‘a result of underlying 
patriarchal structures that value women 
solely for their reproductive capabilities 
and linked to this their role in commanding 
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value for the procurement of cattle’ (2013: 
91).  
Marriage customs have tied young people 
into relations of dependency upon their 
elders for bridewealth payments. They 
have also created opportunities for political 
entrepreneurs to (re)distribute wealth, and 
political and military standing, at a local 
level (Leonardi 2007). Bridewealth may be 
a factor in military recruitment as, following 
the rising cost of dowry, ‘youth may be 
driven to seek patronage elsewhere to 
escape their dependency on elders and 
relatives for bride-wealth’ (Leonardi 2007: 
402). Beswick (2001) documents the 
expansion of polygyny and leviratic 
marriage during the previous war as a 
means to consolidate ‘political, military, 
and economic power’ (Beswick 2001: 38). 
Pinaud describes how commanders, 
through gifts of bridewealth and wives to 
their subordinates, formed a lower stratum 
of followers that strengthened their 
position in the political economy (Pinaud 
2014) and consolidated a military elite 
class (Pinaud 2016).  
Since war broke out again in December 
2013, the focus has largely been upon the 
documentation of sexual violence and 
abduction by warring parties, as well as 
domestic abuse, marital rape, early and 
forced marriage (Justice Africa 2016). A 
United Nations (UN) study found that 
‘during SPLA attacks, women and girls 
were considered a commodity and were 
taken along with civilian property as the 
soldiers moved through village’ (UN 2016). 
There is a growing body of work revealing 
the exploitation of women’s bodies as a 
form of payment, or compensation for the 
hardships of soldiers experienced on the 
frontlines of the current conflict (see 
Oosterom 2014: Justice Africa 2016; 
Luedke and Logan 2017). There are also 
fears that the economic crisis has 
increased the risk of forced and early 
marriage (Justice Africa 2016; USIP 2012).  
 
While violence against women has become 
increasingly visible, there has been less 
consideration given to the ways in which 
women have participated in conflict or 
have exercised positive agency through 
everyday survival strategies and civil 
activism by and on behalf of women (Jok 
2006). For instance, in UN Protection of 
Civilians sites women have sought to win 
rights and justice through the customary 
courts, albeit in careful and often 
unsuccessful negotiations of custom 
(Ibreck and Pendle 2016: 41-44). There is a 
need to investigate the malleability and 
adaptability of concepts and definitions of 
gender in conflict and post-conflict 
environments, and to consider whether and 
how gender identities are re-negotiated 
through processes of violence and 
resistance (Luedke 2014).  
Additionally, more attention is needed to 
the constitution of masculinities, looking 
beyond their role in violence, including 
recognising vulnerabilities and gendered 
violence against men and boys (see 
Carpenter 2016; Luedke 2014) who are 
targeted in the violence, conscripted into 
armed groups, and subjected to forced 
marriage and sexual violence. The 
exclusion of men and boys from the way 
that gender is conceptualised and 
operationalised fails to recognise linkages 
between men and women’s vulnerabilities 
in conflict-affected settings (Carpenter 
2016). There is also a need to question 
whether the marginalisation of men and 
boys may be fuelling a backlash against 
international efforts to empower women 
and promote and protect their rights 
(Leonardi et al. 2010) and exacerbating 
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‘everyday’ violence against female 
populations (Luedke and Logan 2017: 6).  
CRP will look at gender as a cross-cutting 
issue that prompts questions across our 
various research themes and of the 
interventions that we will study.  We will 
seek to develop a constructive relationship 
with others working on gender in South 
Sudan including the What Works 
Programme.  This will ensure that research 
does not duplicate findings that have 
already been established.   
25          South Sudan Synthesis Paper       October 2017  
2. What Works in Addressing 
Violent Conflict 
 
A central objective of the CRP is to deliver 
operationally focused evidence on 
interventions directly aimed at reducing 
violent conflict and preventing conflict 
recurrence.4  It is also concerned with 
understanding the contextual factors that 
affect the effectiveness of these 
interventions. Below, we survey the four 
broad intervention areas that the CRP will 
examine and discuss the implications for 
the CRP’s research agenda in South Sudan.   
2.1 Strengthening authority and legitimacy 
(including at sub-national levels) 
 
When the CPA was signed in 2005, for the 
SPLA, the South Sudanese and key 
international partners, the Government of 
Sudan’s (GoS) commitment to a 
referendum on Southern succession was 
paramount to the legitimacy of the 
agreement and its ability to end the SPLA-
GoS war.  Alongside this, the CPA formed a 
new Government of Southern Sudan, 
dominated by the SPLA/M.  For many, this 
GoSS was simply a sovereign state 
government in waiting. After the CPA, 
however, South-South conflict continued 
across South Sudan and was sometimes 
explicitly targeted against the state.  Many 
donors hoped that by improving the 
capacity and legitimacy of GoSS, including 
through service delivery, they would 
increase people’s voluntary compliance 
with this new government. Donors invested 
billions in this state-building agenda in the 
hope that it would build state legitimacy 
(Moro et al. 2017).  
                                                     
4 Component 1 of CRP ToR focuses on the question of ‘What 
works in addressing violent conflict in developing countries?’. 
The violence in Juba in December 2013 
and then in July 2016 has led to a shift in 
international thinking, including in the UK. 
DFID spending now focuses on 
humanitarian programming with additional 
spending on essential health and education 
services.  After the outbreak of war, donors 
had growing concerns about the 
kleptocratic nature of government 
leadership and there were fears that their 
spending was building the legitimacy of 
potentially kleptocratic government 
leaders.  In the South Sudan context, the 
‘state’ is understood as interchangeable 
with ‘government’ as there is no separate 
framework of ‘stateness’ to which people 
make reference.  Since December 2013, 
donors have debated how best to relate to 
government and the implications for state 
legitimacy.  At certain points, this debate 
has divided donors to the extent that they 
have been unable to work together. 
What works? 
State-building approaches have generally 
come under criticism for being ahistorical 
and decontextualised.  In South Sudan, the 
current consensus about the ‘kleptocratic’ 
nature of government leaders also raises 
questions about the lack of responsiveness 
of donors to these realities before 
December 2013.  As the state-building 
approach was technical and ahistorical, it 
neglected the political tensions that spilled 
over in December 2013 (Pantuliano 2014). 
Research has also questioned 
assumptions that legitimacy is built 
through service provision.  Research by the 
Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium 
(SLRC) has highlighted that citizens’ 
opinions of GoSS are not only shaped by 
the provision of basic services.  Instead, 
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access to services was considered far 
more important, whether provided by 
international stakeholders or the state itself 
(Maxwell et al. 2016; Moro et al. 2017). 
They highlight that state legitimacy is 
political and shaped by political structures, 
ideas and agency (Moro et al. 2017).  In 
South Sudan, the SPLM leaders relied on 
liberation ‘capital’ to legitimise their actions 
and ask for patience when they failed to 
deliver as a nascent, young government 
(Moro et al. 2017).  However, in the current 
war this ‘liberation capital’ is fading. The 
South Sudanese perceived security as a 
basic expectation of government and the 
ongoing war highlights the failure of the 
current government in this key 
responsibility (Moro et al. 2017).  Ethnicity 
also has a role to play in notions of 
legitimacy.  Leaders have used it to 
mobilise armed combatants and voters at 
election time.  At the same time, the SLRC 
research found that South Sudanese are 
rarely involved in decision-making about 
their needs and priorities, with government, 
donors and their partners instead often 
outlining their needs (SLRC 2016: 3-4). 
Importantly, external legitimacy has long 
been key to the SPLA/M (Moro et al. 2017: 
16).  From the outset, the SPLA only 
became a leading rebel group because of 
strong regional and global support.  This 
highlights how significant international 
(including HMG) support (or lack thereof) 
and donor spending has been for the 
legitimacy of the government in South 
Sudan. 
In relation to the current focus on 
humanitarian spending, it is clear that 
humanitarian aid can have consequences 
for legitimacy and public authority.  These, 
in turn, can shape conflict. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, southern Sudan was the locus 
of important innovations in humanitarian 
action, including most notably Operation 
Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the first UN-
authorised relief programme that crossed 
the front lines of an internal war to provide 
relief to civilians in areas controlled by 
rebel forces.  One strand of the literature 
on OLS consists of reviews of the 
humanitarian operations and the context in 
which they were operating. The most 
influential of these are the review of OLS 
commissioned by the UN itself (Karim et al. 
1996) and the independent review of 
humanitarian crises and operations in a 
political context (African Rights 1997). One 
of the issues hotly debated in these 
reviews is the extent to which humanitarian 
actors generate an economy based upon 
relief and relief operations, which distorts 
the local economy and can generate 
incentives among warring parties to 
maintain a humanitarian crisis in order to 
obtain access to relief resources, or to 
manipulate relief supplies in support of 
military goals. On occasions, assistance 
itself has generated local conflicts; for 
example, where it is seen to be allocated 
unfairly between rivalrous communities. 
Such cases even include the provision of 
aid to church groups that has created 
competition for the resources provided 
(Falge 2013). Literature also highlights how 
OLS acted as local substitutes for state 
administrations, shaping and re-shaping 
the social and political landscape (see 
Riehl 2001. This analysis could also be 
relevant to post-2011 and post-December 
2013 dynamics. 
A second strand of literature is concerned 
with the political economy whereby 
humanitarian crises are generated and 
generate benefits to those in power 
(Duffield 1993, 1998, 2001, 2002; Keen 
2008). A counterpart to this is the study of 
coping strategies and the extent to which 
social capital and social networks are 
27          South Sudan Synthesis Paper       October 2017  
central to the ability of communities to 
withstand famine (Deng 2010). 
The current civil war has revived interest in 
these debates, as some of the older 
military tactics appear to have recurred. 
However, since the early 2000s, oil has 
been by far a greater resource and 
resource curse than aid (Patey 2010). 
There has also been interest in the 
‘peacekeeping economy’ generated by the 
presence of UN peacekeepers. Findings 
also indicate accusations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse (SEA) made against 
peacekeepers, showing “outside” 
interveners’ role in the political economy of 
sexual violence in a South Sudanese 
context. This also highlights the 
importance of structural economic factors 
in facilitating abuse against civilians. 
However, one analysis indicates that the 
resources provided by the peacekeeping 
economy are modest in comparison to oil 
rents (Rolandsen 2015).  Yet, as the 
stability of a large income from oil wanes, 
there is a new need to ask questions about 
the role humanitarian aid is playing in the 
war, the economy, patronage and the 
logics of public authority.  
Implications for CRP’s research agenda 
As DFID’s spending in South Sudan does 
not currently focus directly on state-
building, but instead focuses on HARRIS 
and basic service delivery (through Girls’ 
Education South Sudan (GESS) and the 
Health Pooled Fund), CRP will focus on the 
impact of humanitarian spending and 
basic service delivery for the legitimacy of 
public authorities including the state.  Even 
if building legitimacy is not the intention of 
these programmes, there may well be 
unintended impacts. CRP will question in 
what conditions this spending promotes 
inclusive politics at the national and sub-
national level, and builds the legitimacy of 
public authorities who support ‘civicness’.  
In this process, CRP will work alongside 
humanitarian partners and GESS in 
particular, who operate in the selected case 
study sites (outlined below). This research 
will engage with ongoing debates about 
the appropriate relationship between GoSS, 
armed opposition groups, donors and their 
partners, including in the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. This is pertinent as 
relations during the current conflict have 
led to a growing sense of anti-international 
sentiment from the state, narrowing the 
space for humanitarian access and leading 
to the targeting of aid workers.  
It is evident that the ability of local 
humanitarian workers to survive and to 
continue to operate in the extremely 
turbulent context of South Sudan depends 
less on their institutional placement than it 
does on their personal networks and skills 
at understanding and navigating the 
political marketplace. A successful local 
humanitarian worker must possess 
elements of the same skill set as a political 
entrepreneur. The same is true for 
journalists, human rights advocates, 
church leaders and others who seek to 
promote humane values and practices 
such as judges, lawyers and local 
peacemakers. The CRP will use a life 
history methodology for exploring these 
individuals’ strategies, and how best they 
have been supported by international 
partners. 
2.2 Resource interventions and the 
management of land and boundaries 
 
International actors and NGOs have often 
worked on the assumption that conflicts 
are based on resource scarcity, including 
conflict between pastoralists and between 
pastoralists and agrarian farmers. In 
response, resource management is often 
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proposed as if it was a technical, apolitical 
exercise. These assumptions, however, 
mask much more complicated realities, 
including local and national political 
involvement in many of these conflicts 
(SLRC 2016).  Assumptions about the 
technical and neutral nature of 
interventions also makes them more easily 
captured by certain political interests. 
Land and boundary conflicts provide an 
example of this.  Land has long been the 
focus of inter-communal conflict within 
South Sudan and conflict between 
governing authorities (and investors) and 
local communities. These conflicts are 
often bound up with questions of resource 
ownership and extraction.  These are 
particularly salient in areas where there are 
resources that can be used to fund the 
political marketplace such as oil, other 
mineral resources, timber and 
commercially-viable farmland, and in urban 
areas. Contestation over the control of land 
penetrates many institutions of 
governance and is intrinsic to the 
functioning of public authorities in South 
Sudan.  People and authorities draw on 
various ideas on which to base their claims 
for land, including livelihoods, history and 
current political and military power. In 
examining land disputes, we may see the 
interplay between the logic of the political 
marketplace, the invocation of moral 
populism (especially by community 
leaders), and attempts to pursue civil 
struggles in the legal arena. 
Historically, land has not been perceived as 
a salient issue in conflict in South Sudan, 
as there was no shortage of it. Yet, 
increasingly, violent actors explicitly 
conflict over land or accuse government 
forces and militias of pursuing land grabs.  
As Leonardi and Santchi highlight, South 
Sudanese perceptions of the value of land 
have changed in times of war but also in 
times of peace (Leonardi and Santchi 
2016).  The increase in land disputes 
includes top-down manipulation and land 
grabs, but is also a result of people 
attempting to gain security over land by 
excluding others (Leonardi and Sancthi 
2016). 
Moreover, ethnic and clan identities are 
rooted in and reinforced by the allocation 
of customary land rights, and as scholars 
of conflict in Africa have observed this is 
central to explaining the ethnic 
organisation of violence (Boone 2014). 
While issues of land governance, the 
effects of land policies and the exploitation 
of land as a resource for the political 
marketplace in South Sudan’s current 
conflict are yet to be fully explored, there is 
a body of existing scholarship on South 
Sudan that illuminates the political 
significance of land and boundaries in 
conflict. This has several components, 
including: international boundaries; internal 
administrative boundaries; the status of 
borders and border trade; conflict over land 
including special questions concerning 
urban land; and conflict over grazing land 
or land rich in oil, minerals, teak, wildlife 
and water sources.  
Internal administrative boundaries have 
emerged as sites of conflict and extraction, 
compounded by the numerous disputes 
and uncertainties over the status of 
administrative units and borders following 
the end of the 1983-2005 war, and the 
2015 executive decision to increase the 
number of states in South Sudan from ten 
to 28. Among the studies of these 
phenomena are Schomerus and Allen 
(2010) and Cormack (2016). 
Hirblinger (2015) shows how traditional 
authorities have been co-opted as a 
mechanism for state control of land. The 
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large-scale population movements during 
the long war created complex dynamics of 
land claims (Schomerus and Allen 2010). 
Following the CPA, the prospects of re-
establishing some form of status quo ante 
in terms of land occupation and land rights 
were remote. For as long as there has been 
recorded or remembered history, people 
and communities have moved and land 
rights have been renegotiated (Thomas 
2015). This includes a pattern of cross-
border movement between South Sudan 
and northern Uganda, with populations 
moving back and forth multiple times over 
the last half century (and longer), though 
never before with the scale and speed of 
the 2016-17 exodus. Internal displacement 
associated with the current war in 
Equatoria has led to a plethora of new land 
claims which are not accommodated 
within existing legal mechanisms (Justin 
and van Leeuwen 2016). 
Urban land has been a particular focus of 
dispute and conflict since the CPA, 
especially with the dramatic growth of 
Juba and the increasing value of urban real 
estate (Grant and Thompson 2013; 
McMichael 2015). Informal networks of 
patronage served as the central 
mechanisms for allocating land in 
situations of legal uncertainty, or overriding 
legal process (McMichael 2014) with 
different levels and institutions of 
government wrangling among themselves 
(Badiey 2013). 
Implications for CRP’s research agenda 
The logic of the political marketplace 
provides a useful framework in which to 
understand resource management in 
South Sudan, including resource capture by 
the political marketplace.  ‘Civicness’ also 
provides a way to understand inter-
community relations that can be built 
through resource sharing.  The CRP will 
use these frameworks to look at resource 
conflicts but also the long-term 
implications of interventions that have 
been designed to improve resource 
management. 
The CRP will work alongside the South 
Sudan Law Society (SSLS) and local civil 
society groups in our case study locations 
to ensure that the research impacts on the 
practice of implementing organisations 
and that our recommendations are 
relevant to the policy community.  The 
SSLS has carried out various work on land 
and resource management in the post CPA 
era. 
2.3 Security Interventions 
 
The constitutions of South Sudan have 
asserted security as a primary 
responsibility of the national government 
(for example, Transitional Constitution of 
South Sudan 2011, Part 4 53.1.a).  The 
government security arrangements in 
South Sudan have been shaped not only by 
national politics and decisions, but also by 
internationally supported peace 
agreements including the 2005 CPA, the 
subsequent 2006 Juba Declaration and 
now the August 2015 agreement.  The 
security provisions have often been highly 
politicised sticking points of such 
agreements (LeRiche 2015).  Military 
groups’ exclusion from the peace 
agreements has only made them feel more 
insecure under the new arrangements and 
more willing to create their own security 
provisions for themselves and the 
communities with which they are 
associated (see Young 2012).  The 
wartime experience of the 1980s and 
1990s had created a plurality of armed 
groups and security providers in what 
became a complex security arena.  The 
CPA demanded that ‘Other [non-SPLA or 
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SAF] Armed Groups’ either be absorbed 
into the Southern government forces or be 
disarmed (or join the then-existing Joint 
Integrated Units with the northern army).  
The SPLA and other government forces 
were meant to become the sole provider 
across all of South Sudan.  The 
government security forces evolved rapidly 
in this post CPA era as they absorbed new 
troops at different times (Snowden 2012).  
However, this imagined government 
monopoly over security was a massive 
departure from the reality of security 
arrangements at the time.  Many South 
Sudanese had spent the last two decades 
fighting the SPLA and did not trust them to 
provide security.  The violence since 
December 2013 in South Sudan can be 
seen as a trajectory from exclusion of 
some armed groups ten years before at the 
CPA.   
In attempts both to increase the security of 
the government and to move towards a 
government monopoly on violence, the 
government carried out a series of 
disarmament campaigns amongst non-
state actors after 2005.  The first major 
disarmament exercise following the CPA 
was conducted in Jonglei, aimed at the 
Nuer ‘White Army’ and other militia (Small 
Arms Survey 2006-07; Arnold and Alden 
2007).  Community concerns about having 
to rely on only the government for security 
prompted communities to violently oppose 
disarmament.  Much bloodshed followed.  
The violence used by the government to 
disarm only further increased people’s 
perceived need to have other security 
providers beyond the government (Rands 
and LeRiche 2012; Saferworld 2012; Young 
2010).  Many South Sudanese still reply on 
local defence forces for their own physical 
security (Saferworld 2017).  
The international community (including the 
governments of the USA, China, the UK and 
Norway) until December 2013 largely acted 
on the assumption that promoting the 
government security forces would be 
synonymous with ending conflict and 
protecting human security.  The post CPA 
literature on security sector reform (SSR) in 
southern Sudan indicates the difficulty of 
professionalising and downsizing a military 
establishment that was being enlarged in 
accordance with two intertwined logics; 
namely, the need to challenge or deter the 
Sudanese Armed Forces in the event of a 
militarily-contested separation and the 
need to establish military dominance 
throughout the territory of southern Sudan, 
which was militarised in a highly 
fragmented manner (de Waal 2014). The 
key documentation on the SSR process 
shows that external technical assistance of 
various kinds was utilised towards these 
goals (Lewis 2009; Rands 2010; Snowden 
2012; Small Arms Survey 2009).  A focus 
on the technical nature of reform often 
resulted in a blind eye being turned to the 
politics and emerging nature of the 
government security sector.  To the extent 
that disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) efforts proceeded, they 
did so because they were consistent with 
the overall political-military goals of the 
SPLA leadership (Munive 2013, 2014; 
Phayal, Khadka and Thyne 2015).  
Since December 2013, international actors 
have been more cautious in their approach 
to SSR.  December 2013 was a brutal 
reminder that the SPLA and other national 
security actors were not engaged in SSR 
with the aim of a state monopoly on the 
provision of security. After December 2013, 
it was also untenable to hold that the SPLA 
was a homogenous force; it appeared to 
better resemble a loose collection of 
militias.  Previous SSR programmes had 
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been based on the assumptions of a state-
centric model of security.   
Despite scepticism about this formal, 
state-centric SSR, the demand for SSR has 
remained and has been a key part of the 
2015 ARCSS agreement that continues to 
gain external funding.  Yet, at the same 
time, the security arrangements under 
ARCSS are largely blamed for the July 
2016 eruption of violence in Juba.  Plus, in 
reality, authorities and institutions that 
provide security in South Sudan remain 
more fragmented than ever. Many South 
Sudanese rely primarily on local defence 
forces for their security (Saferworld 2017).  
Therefore, in South Sudan it is better 
described as a ‘security arena’ than 
anything that would imply a firm structure 
or government monopoly.   
A consistent gap in the SSR literature and 
policy is analysis of the extent and impact 
of neighbouring states’ involvement in 
security in South Sudan.  Ethiopia, Sudan 
and Uganda are each extensively engaged 
in security provision in South Sudan, and 
as they remain so and indeed deepen their 
involvement, the South Sudanese security 
sector is likely to bear the imprint of the 
security and political priorities of these 
actors, as well as their modes of operation. 
It is also important, as has been 
mentioned, to investigate the gendered 
dynamics of the security sector’s 
mobilisation and SSR. Duriesmith’s (2015) 
study of DDR programmes after the CPA 
calls on us to reflect on the ways in which 
interventions not only fail to challenge 
gender inequalities but can even entrench 
patriarchal authority and militarised 
masculinity. 
Implications for CRP’s research agenda 
The CRP’s research will focus on a broad 
understanding of a ‘security arena’.  It will 
consider some of the longer-term 
implications of previous and current 
programmes that are explicitly focused on 
SSR, as well as looking at other ways this 
arena has been intentionally or 
unintentionally changed.  It will also 
consider the implications of broader 
regional engagement in the South Sudan 
security arena. Lastly it will consider the 
gendered dynamics of the security sector 
mobilisation and SSR.  To ensure its policy 
relevance, the CRP will work with a regional 
expert on this research on the security 
arena. 
2.4 Civil Society and Community Mediation 
Interventions  
 
The proliferation of conflict in South Sudan 
over decades has resulted in deep 
divisions between and within communities.  
In response, there has also been a rich 
experience in interventions in conflict 
mediation at different levels, involving 
diverse actors including national elites, 
churches, regional bodies and international 
diplomats and policymakers.  
The 1990s and early 2000s were especially 
notable for the innovations in local 
peacemaking throughout southern Sudan. 
South–South violence had coloured the 
1980s and 1990s as a result of the 
Anyanya II split with the SPLA, the 1991 
split in the SPLA, and as local defence 
forces formed to defend themselves 
against the predatory nature of the SPLA.  
Shifting elite politics and international 
conditions of humanitarian aid also 
created space for formal SPLM recognition 
of civil public authorities that would 
eventually host these local level peace 
dialogues. Church groups, civil society 
organisations and customary authorities 
felt empowered to press for a more 
accountable SPLM and local reconciliation 
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and peacemaking.  By the end of the 
1990s, after periods of famine, people also 
had a new demand for peace (Duany 
2014). The 1999 Wunlit Peace Agreement 
between the Western Dinka and Nuer is 
often cited as indicative of the potential 
achievements of local peace agreements.  
This agreement is described as “people-to-
people” in contrast to an elite agreement.  
This peace between people of SPLA 
controlled areas and people of the 
homelands of Riek Machar (who had 
defected from the SPLA in 1991) pre-
empted Riek Machar’s return to the SPLA a 
couple of years later.   
Bradbury, Ryle, Medley and Sansculotte-
Greenidge have documented how, by the 
2000s, local peace meetings had “become 
an established part of the complex 
intervention by humanitarian and human 
rights organizations in Sudan” (Bradbury et 
al. 2006: 6).  Local peace meetings and 
their support by the international 
community proliferated in the post CPA 
era.  Therefore, local peace agreements in 
South Sudan are also often multi-layered 
and involve regional and national 
governments as well as external actors 
such as the UN, international donors and 
international NGOs (Santschi 2014).  Wunlit 
was arguably only successful because it 
included stakeholders from the SPLM/A 
leadership (Santschi 2014). However, 
despite being multi-layer, they have been 
criticised for only focusing on the local and 
ignoring the reality that violent conflict at 
the local level cannot be separated from 
the wider armed conflict and politics 
(Bradbury et al. 2006).  
Santchi has also highlighted that local 
justice and conflict resolution mechanisms 
are strongly intertwined in South Sudan; 
chiefs try cases and are also involved in 
local peace processes (Santchi 2014).  For 
others, the lessons learned from Wunlit 
include that people-to-people peace 
initiatives are “not about conferences.... 
People-to-people requires months and 
indeed years of mobilisation and 
awareness raising, working with chiefs, 
elders, and women” (Ashworth 2014). 
Current attention has returned to 
community level dialogue and mediation 
not only to accompany elite level talks but 
as a possible alternative whilst elite talks 
are failing to gain traction.  Many donors 
and partners are still trying to understand 
appropriate local public authorities and 
networks of authorities to work with.  The 
South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) 
has been a focus for a sudden, relatively 
recent flurry of donor funding.  The 
attraction of the church, the SSCC and 
other faith-based organisations is that they 
appear both to have legitimacy at a very 
local level and across ethnic divides, and 
also to have representation nationally and 
internationally.   
HMG and other concerned countries, at the 
same time, continue to engage in high-level 
peacemaking that contributes to the 
context for these community level 
dialogues.  South Sudan’s national peace 
processes have generated a small but 
vibrant literature of their own. There are 
important accounts of the 1965 ‘Round 
Table’ and the 1972 Addis Ababa talks by 
participants (Alier 1990; Beshir 1984). 
There are important critiques of the IGAD 
process that led to the CPA (Rolandsen 
2011; Young 2005, 2012; Johnson 2012; 
Jok 2017) including explorations of the 
issue of self-determination (Johnson 2013) 
and the delinking of the negotiations for 
southern Sudan from those for Darfur 
(Srinavasan 2013) and the approach to 
dealing with security arrangements (de 
Waal 2017). 
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For a detailed account of the negotiations 
leading to the CPA, we have the memoirs 
of the chief mediator Gen. Lazarus 
Sumbeiywo (Waihenya 2006) and Hilde 
Johnson, then Norwegian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (Johnson 2011). The 
personal accounts of participants are likely 
to be somewhat subjective and selective. 
For the recent peace process, Hilde 
Johnson, then UN Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General (SRSG), has also 
written an account (Johnson 2016), which 
may be handicapped by the fact that she 
was excluded from some of the key 
deliberations and felt the need to defend 
her record against public criticism. Only in 
one instance—the talks in Abuja in 1992—
do we have an account based on a 
systematic evaluation of documentary 
evidence including notes of the meetings 
(Wöndu and Lesch 2000). The detail 
provided by Wöndu and Lesch illustrates 
the importance of such properly-
documented analyses. The archive of 
materials from the IGAD negotiations from 
1994 to 2005 is located at IGAD 
headquarters in Djibouti but has not been 
accessed by any researcher. The World 
Peace Foundation Sudan Peace Archive 
has a compilation of documents from the 
African Union High-Level Implementation 
Panel (AUHIP) (2009-12) during the period 
in which the AUHIP was responsible for 
facilitating the talks between the GoS and 
SPLM on post-referendum and post-
secession arrangements, and 
subsequently the negotiations to resolve 
the border war of April 2012.  
This literature collectively highlights that 
mediation has tended to be studied at the 
community, local or international level 
without tracing the important relations and 
tensions between mediation interventions 
at different levels, and between actors at 
different levels.  There is still a lack of 
understanding about the conditions in 
which community dialogues are captured 
by the national political marketplace and 
when they are able to preserve space for 
‘civicness’.  For example, there was much 
discussion about civil society inclusion 
during the 2014 IGAD discussions but 
there has been little documented about the 
nature of the civil society that participated 
and the impact of their interaction with 
IGAD.  There is also a lack of 
understanding about how things at the 
community level can influence dynamics at 
the national and international level.  Wunlit, 
for example, is discussed as pre-dating 
national SPLA reunification and then the 
CPA. These interactions between levels are 
not understood. However, they are 
important for HMG to understand not only 
their work on community mediation and 
their work on national peacemaking, but 
also how these link together. 
Implications for CRP’s research agenda 
As HMG intends to invest in community 
level mediation, the CRP will use the 
framework of the three logics to explore 
how such mediations reduce conflict and 
also build authority. It will ask under what 
conditions these mediations result in 
‘civicness’, rather than being captured by 
the political marketplace and moral 
populism. The research will consider the 
impact of donor funding on these 
community level mediations and the 
conditions in which this increases (not 
detracts from) their ability to produce 
peace, accountability and greater freedom 
of choice for South Sudanese. 
In order to do this, the CRP will focus on 
the church and faith-based organisations.  
Since Wunlit, the church has been involved 
in hosting these community level 
mediations that have often involved chiefs 
and spiritual leaders. Now, the SSCC has 
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also become a prominent, donor funded 
actor. Plus, unusually, the church has a 
presence in all the case study sites we will 
explore. They will not be the only mediators 
considered, but will be a focus. 
At the same time, HMG continues to be 
involved in national peacemaking efforts 
through the Troika and support to IGAD.  
The CRP is interested in the links between 
these community level mediations and the 
formal and informal national dynamics, 
and will critically consider the role of IGAD.   
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3. Research Agenda 
 
One particular added value of the CRP is its 
capacity to be flexible and to respond to 
events as they unfold and new research 
questions as they are posed. Our research 
has the potential for rapid turnaround with 
research outputs in response to both 
immediate events and new questions.  As 
HMG interventions and interests adapt in 
South Sudan, CRP also has the potential to 
be responsive. The schedule of research 
activities and outputs outlined below is 
consequently provisional and subject to 
revision.5 
We begin with the hypotheses that: (1) the 
state is a political marketplace in which key 
actors bargain for loyalty and support 
based on monetary transactions and the 
use of violence to eliminate rivals; (2) this 
system is inherently unstable, predatory, 
turbulent and prone to erupt into violence; 
(3) there is a parallel and related logic of 
governance based on the 
instrumentalisation of moral norms and 
constructs of religion and identity to 
cultivate power (moral populism/symbolic 
patronage); and (4) the political 
marketplace faces resistance in the form 
of public authorities that privilege a 
countervailing logic of ‘civicness’ that 
aspire to greater freedom of choice and 
accountability.  The aim will be to explore 
and elaborate upon these existing ideas 
and to reveal the more complex nuances 
and contestations of this political 
marketplace at subnational and local 
levels, including its possible fragmentation.  
By observing over time, we will be able to 
see how conflict, the changing economy 
and changing international relations impact 
the political marketplace. This will provide 
opportunities to see which international 
                                                     
5 All such changes will be undertaken in consultation with DFID. 
interventions have the potential to have 
more positive influence over time. 
The research will examine vertical 
relationships between political 
entrepreneurs active in the national 
political marketplace and the people in 
their home communities from whom they 
garner support, including the human and 
material resources for warfare. It will seek 
to enrich our understanding of the 
networks and transactions that underpin 
the power of individual elites and provide 
insights into the ways in which these might 
be challenged or transformed towards civil, 
accountable relations of governance.  This 
will give insights into which networks and 
transactions might be more amenable to 
international influence.  
The research will also consider what 
international interventions to mitigate 
conflict work in South Sudan, and how they 
work.  The research will use the framework 
of the three logics to explore the impact 
these interventions can have. 
3.1 Key Research Questions  
  
Examining the Evolution of Persistent 
Violent Conflicts 
i. What are the key economic 
resources that fund the political 
marketplace?  How do these 
economic and political powers 
interact?  How has the nature of 
the political marketplace 
changed in response to 
changing economic 
circumstances and the ongoing 
war? 
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ii. How do elite level actors in 
South Sudan mobilise support 
from and maintain relationships 
with other levels of public 
authority in South Sudan?  
iii. How do these elite actors 
mobilise support amongst a 
constituency?  
iv. How do these mobilise armed 
combatants to fight on their 
behalf?  To what extent do 
political marketplace 
entrepreneurs exploit and 
perpetuate ethnic, gender and 
generational inequalities? 
v. What role are businessmen 
playing in the political 
marketplace and violent conflict 
in South Sudan? 
vi. What political space is there for 
South Sudanese themselves to 
push back against the terms of 
the political marketplace and 
involvement in violent conflict?  
What space is there for 
increased freedom of choice, 
change and accountability? 
vii. How and to what extent do local 
norms, beliefs and identities 
matter?  What role do moral 
factors or forms of ‘symbolic 
patronage’ play in either 
sustaining the political 
marketplace or counteracting it, 
given that land, cattle, 
bridewealth and other material 
resources may also have 
symbolic value, while narratives 
of identity, including gendered 
identity, and memory may also 
be deployed for politically 
strategic ends to mobilise 
violence or demand peace? 
viii. How does the South Sudanese 
political marketplace interact 
with other logics of authority at a 
regional and international level?  
How do elite level actors build 
relationships internationally?  
How and to what extent are 
these relations built upon 
monetary/material transactions? 
Are they changing over time and 
place and what are the main 
factors which effect change / 
impact relations?  
ix. Do other levels of public 
authority that have influence at 
subnational and local levels also 
operate by the logic of the 
political marketplace?  Do they 
challenge or counteract this 
logic and present alternative 
logics of governance? 
Examining What Works in Addressing 
Violent Conflict in Developing Countries 
i. Building State Capacity and 
Legitimacy 
How do international humanitarian and 
basic service interventions contribute to 
shaping the capacity and legitimacy of 
state actors and other forms of public 
authority? How and to what extent do they 
contribute to undermining or constructing 
the legitimacy of local and national public 
authorities, including through rule of law 
promotion and humanitarian responses, 
especially food aid? How have 
humanitarian actors and those providing 
basic services contributed to the capacity 
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and legitimacy of public authorities e.g. 
local officials, national elites, or chiefs, 
through their distribution of aid and 
governance of the PoC sites?  
ii. Natural Resource Management  
How and to what extent do government, 
international or community level 
interventions aimed at managing natural 
resources fuel or prevent conflict? How do 
they relate to ongoing processes of 
resource capture associated with the 
political marketplace logic? To what extent 
are they preventing or contributing to the 
emergence of civicness? 
iii. Security Sector Reform 
What has been the longer-term impact of 
formal security sector reforms in the post 
CPA period at the national and local levels?  
How have regional actors shaped reform 
processes?  What logics of authority are 
supported by these reforms?  How have 
local public authorities informally reformed 
the security arena? How have concepts of 
masculinity and gender norms been 
defined in the security arena and are they 
considered in SSR interventions? 
iv. Community Level Dialogues and 
Mediation 
How have community level dialogues and 
mediation interacted with other local 
governance mechanisms? How do they 
relate to national, regional and international 
mediation initiatives? To what extent have 
local peace agreements been based on the 
logics of the political marketplace, moral 
populism and civicness?  Under what 
conditions do these mediations promote 
South Sudanese freedom of choice and 
help people push for change and 
accountability?  What do these local 
dialogues highlight about the contrasting 
logics of elite peace agreements?  What 
does this teach us about the conditions 
and opportunities for external 
interventions? What roles have the Church 
and faith-based organisations played in 
mediation? 
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4.  Research Approach and Methods 
4.1 Political marketplace case studies 
 
The political marketplace workshops series 
will involve CRP researchers, including an 
economist, and DFID economists, in 
developing the methods and metrics for 
political marketplace research, both at a 
general or theoretical level and also in 
application to each of the five CRP 
countries, including South Sudan. Please 
see the concept note for the political 
marketplace workshops for further details.  
The work of CRP will also include a 
researcher who is experienced in economic 
analysis and whose principal role is to 
develop the political marketplace toolkit 
through the above workshops and by 
working alongside the country-focused 
researchers.  This toolkit will be used in 
each of the countries, and then experience 
in the field will feed back into to the 
development of the theory and toolkit over 
the course of CRP.        
In South Sudan, to make use of the toolkit, 
we will employ a comparative case study 
methodology.  Working in specific areas 
will allow us to establish the in-depth 
information (or proxy and indirect 
indicators) needed to assess and measure 
a political market, including: market 
organisation, sources and nature of 
political financial flows, prices and political 
business objectives, strategies and skills.  
Our sites (examined in more detail below) 
are similar in the sense that they are ideal 
sites in which to examine power networks 
associated with the political marketplace, 
but they are diverse in terms of the ethnic 
identities of people who live there, the 
basis of local economies, their histories of 
violence and their geographic locations, 
including borders with neighbouring 
countries. Each will be examined 
longitudinally, tracing processes and 
patterns over the three years of the project, 
while taking account of historical patterns.  
 
While pursuing this comparative study, we 
will also treat each location as its own rich 
research site. This will allow us to uncover 
insights into the forms of public authority 
that exist in each of these localities, their 
histories, and the logics by which they 
govern. We will seek to identify the 
resources and ideas they deploy to win 
voluntary compliance and whether these 
modes of governance are implicated in 
violence, and political marketplace/moral 
populist logics, or might display civic 
concern, civicness and commitments to 
peace.  
Finally, we do not treat the areas as 
discrete geographical localities, given 
contestation over borders and historical 
patterns of displacement in South Sudan. 
Instead we integrate the elites who do not 
permanently live in these locations, and 
people who are displaced from or who 
move back and forth to them, into the case 
study.  
Case Studies and International 
Interventions 
The case studies have also been selected 
partly as they have been the focus of a 
range of different international 
interventions.  At the same time, all of 
these case studies have experienced a 
plurality of these interventions in varying 
degrees over time.  By studying the 
interventions in relation to this diversity of 
case studies we will be able to see what 
works in a specific site and how this 
relates to what works elsewhere. It will also 
help us understand the connections to 
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national interventions and political 
dynamics. 
In each case study site, we will identify 
practitioners and policy experts that we 
can work alongside to shape the details of 
the research itself and the resulting policy 
impact.  For example, in studying 
community level mediations we will work 
with pre-existing contacts in the church 
and faith-based organisations.  This will 
allow us to study the role of these local 
public authorities and their relationship 
with the national SSCC’s process as well as 
other peacemaking efforts. We offer more 
detail on our proposed partnerships and 
collaborations below.  
4.2 Research Methods  
 
The field research will principally be based 
on qualitative methods and driven by 
political ethnography (the use of 
ethnographic methods to study power 
relations and the study of political 
processes and practices). We are 
principally concerned with observing and 
examining change over time by working 
with the local research network member(s) 
in each site. Methods include:  
1. Participant observation in public 
processes, including public 
meetings, court cases, ceremonies 
and rituals, aid distributions and 
community mediation activities. 
2. Interviews gathering the life 
histories of individuals; the 
biographies of elites, businessmen, 
chiefs, church leaders and public 
authorities, which will be key to 
understanding their relationship 
with local communities, and local 
and national government figures 
and institutions. 
3. Qualitative surveys to map public 
authorities including their 
interaction with the economy. 
4. Qualitative surveys to understand 
the dynamics of the local economy.  
5. Gathering documentary evidence, 
including the collection of 
documents relating to conflict, 
dispute mediation or resolution, and 
governance arrangements such as 
minutes of meetings, photos, 
newspaper reports and local maps.  
For example, the research will make 
use of the World Peace Foundation 
Sudan Peace Archive which has 
extensive documentation of the 
negotiations that can shed light on a 
range of issues during and after the 
independence of South Sudan, 
including the north-south border, 
Abyei, citizenship, security 
arrangements, financial 
arrangements, the oil shut-down of 
January 2012 and the border war 
and its resolution later in 2012. This 
can be used to illustrate the 
dynamics of the logics of conflict, 
as they play out in peace 
negotiations, and draw conclusions 
and lessons about the efficacy and 
limitations of various kinds of 
conflict resolution engagement. 
6. CRP will employ training sessions, 
interactive dialogues and other 
action research methodologies to 
share and elaborate insights and 
develop collective analyses (further 
developing approaches and 
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networks established by Justice and 
Security Research Programme 
(JSRP) researchers). 
4.3 Policy development and engagement 
 
The South Sudan Conflict Research Panel 
The CRP will establish a small group of 
prominent South Sudanese academics and 
public intellectuals with the purposes of 
action research and policy analysis. So far 
David Deng, Jok Madut Jok, Leben Moro 
and Edmund Yakani have been consulted 
on the utility, viability of the initiative and 
have expressed interest in participation; 
other prominent scholars including Luka 
Biong Deng and Peter Adwok Nyaba will 
also be invited. The group is likely to 
number 8-10 in total, and there will be an 
emphasis on ensuring it includes 
individuals with diverse backgrounds and 
opinions. Further contacts will be explored 
during the inception phase and confirmed 
in the initial phase of the project.  
1. The panel will contribute to the 
research through a participatory 
action research approach involving 
dialogue and deliberation on 
theories and issues at the core of 
the CRP agenda. For instance, the 
group will reflect upon and 
contribute to the elaboration of 
concepts deployed in the CRP 
analytical framework, adapting and 
testing the political marketplace and 
civicness concepts against 
vernacular concepts and 
understandings.  
2. The group will serve to contribute to 
the development of policy 
recommendations related to 
peacemaking, humanitarian 
response and security sector 
reform, drawing upon the field 
research. As South Sudanese elites, 
with diverse ethnic and kinship 
backgrounds and political 
allegiances, the group will contribute 
a deep understanding of the realities 
of South Sudan’s internal politics 
and the best approaches to 
communicating agendas for 
change.   
3. The group will serve as a vehicle for 
the dissemination of knowledge 
gathered by the CRP, encouraging 
the development of an epistemic 
community and potential advocates 
for appropriate reforms.  
4. The group will meet annually for 
three days in Kenya including closed 
sessions for the action research and 
development of policy briefings and 
one open session to provide a 
resource for immediate feedback 
for DfID staff and other relevant 
humanitarian actors based in 
Nairobi.   
Collaborating with Policy Makers 
As well as working closely with HMG staff 
in the UK and South Sudan, CRP will draw 
on a range of other collaborative 
relationships to ensure the research has a 
significant policy impact.   
In South Sudan, the UK-funded Conflict 
Sensitivity Resource Facility (CSRF) 
supports the use of conflict sensitivity in 
donor strategies and programming in 
South Sudan.  Since it started in 2016, 
CSRF has been developing various ways to 
communicate research and to influence 
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donors and partners in South Sudan.  CRP 
will collaborate with CSRF to influence this 
Juba-based community and to make policy 
recommendations based on the research 
findings from CRP. 
CRP will also brief and exchange ideas with 
other similar programmes in South Sudan 
that are funded by other donors.  We will 
regularly seek the advice of HMG in South 
Sudan about appropriate contacts in other 
programmes.   
In addition, CRP proposes to develop a 
collaborative relationship with Girls’ 
Education in South Sudan (GESS).  We will 
work together to refine research around 
questions concerning interventions’ impact 
on the capacity and legitimacy of South 
Sudanese institutions and authorities.  As 
GESS operates at a national level but 
across the country at a sub-national level, it 
will be possible to develop comparative 
research in our case study sites.  We are 
hoping that this work alongside GESS will 
help us develop our understanding of 
‘civicness’ in South Sudan and 
interventions that can push for change and 
accountability. 
In addition, across all the case study sites, 
we will work alongside faith-based 
organisations and churches that we 
already have established contacts with and 
that we know are engaged in community 
mediation work.  We are interested in their 
relationship with the national church and 
the South Sudan Council of Churches, as 
well as with other national political and 
economic dynamics.  We will then work 
with these organisations when appropriate 
to make policy recommendations.   
Local Research Network 
Central to the research will be working 
alongside a network of local researchers 
who are immersed in the settings of each 
case study site.  This network of 
researchers includes people that have 
previously researched on the JSRP or other 
research projects.  Many of these 
researchers are also activists for ‘civicness’ 
in their own rights.   
4.5 CRP Data  
 
Across CRP various datasets will be built 
and analysed.  This will include data 
relating to South Sudan and will have policy 
recommendations that are relevant for 
South Sudan.  CRP will work alongside 
CSRF and other implementing 
organisations discussed in this paper 
(including GESS, the church and the SSLS) 
to make sure the findings from this 
quantitative research influences policy and 
its implementation. 
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Conclusion 
 
This synthesis of debates and literature 
confirms the need for further research into 
the evolution of conflict in South Sudan 
and interventions that have tried to reduce 
conflict.  It is apparent that interventions 
will have a better hope of success if they 
start from a deeper understanding of the 
contemporary logics of the political 
marketplace and the networks and roles of 
prominent political entrepreneurs. There is 
also a need to understand international 
interventions in relation to these logics of 
moral populism and civicness. Do 
interventions entrench exclusive identities 
that are easily instrumentalised by political 
entrepreneurs?  Or do they protect space 
for civicness, freedom of choice and 
opportunities to push for positive social 
change? We already have detailed insights 
into various forms of public authority, such 
as chiefs and militia groups, but we need to 
investigate the connections between 
authorities at different levels.  Overall, there 
is a need to bridge the gap between the 
study of national actors and institutions 
and rich local analyses, and to instead 
focus the lens on the relations between 
them, considering the politics of the ‘sub-
national’ and its connections to the 
national, regional and international. The 
CRP agenda is designed to fill this gap by 
undertaking field research at key politically 
strategic case study sites and employing 
political ethnography over time and 
innovative participatory action research 
approaches.  Alongside this, the CRP will 
provide insights into the cross-cutting 
issues of gender and regional conflict 
dynamics that also impact the evolution of 
conflict in South Sudan.   
CRP aims to provide deep insights into the 
long-term evolution of violent conflict and 
to learn lessons from interventions that 
have and have not worked in order to 
inform policy makers. We will ensure the 
policy relevance of our research by working 
alongside specific implementing 
organisations, as well as by working 
closely with HMG throughout the research 
and the presentation of its findings.  
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